LEGAL DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF AUTHORITARIANISM
FernandaG. Nicola'
In an age of authoritarianism,when autocratic governments are
weakening thefoundations ofconstitutionaldemocraciesor turning

them into illiberalones, the role of thejudicial branch is paramount
to entrench a liberalversion of the rule of law that will inevitably
come under attackfor being politicallymotivated. By using its legal
diplomatic skills, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has
carefully asserted its role in denouncing the lack of an effective
judicial protection in international and domestic contexts. Legal
diplomacy is a form of legal reasoning that enables courts to
balance conflictingconsiderationswhen the law "runsout" seeking
to weigh solutions in foreign relations against their institutional
self-preservation. A comparison of the legal diplomacy of the
Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) since the late
eighteenth-century with its post-WWII European counterpart, the
CJEU, shows how the judicialization of foreign relations entails
similar doctrinal tools and policy arguments with opposite
ideological values. Against that backdrop, this Article shows that
the SCOTUS and the CJEU have relied on similar balancingtools
using separation of powers and federalism doctrines in foreign
relations for more liberal or conservative outcomes while
preserving their authoritative roles. The recentjurisprudence on
judicial independence provides a powerful example of how the
CJEUhas translatedits balancingfrom foreign to internal affairs
to curb authoritarianpractices in Polandand Hungary. Through
formalism and deference, the CJEU is cautiously laying out a

liberalrule of law jurisprudencethat will be of use to the political
branchesto more effectively sanction rule of law violations but will
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inevitably trigger suspicion and backlash towards the Court's
supranationallaw making power.
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INTRODUCTION
The notion of judicializing foreign relations can sound paradoxical, since within
sovereign states diplomacy has typically been a prerogative of the executive branch.
However, scholars of international courts note that the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) played a diplomatic role in
the Cold War era by resolving disputes, both between sovereign states and between
individuals and states. In so doing, these courts helped avoid wars and other
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fundamental conflicts. 2 In recent years, national and supranational courts have begun
to intervene in foreign relations issues more regularly due to a confluence of factors:
the de-funding of diplomatic services, the increased executive control of military and
development aid,3 and the strategic use of trade wars and international agreements by
governments aiming to advantage domestic political interests.4
Against this backdrop, this Article shows how the Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have
deployed similar legal reasoning in foreign relations, using separation of powers and
federalism doctrines to balance conflicting considerations. 5 Rather than questioning
the expansion of judicial power in foreign relations or the "infant disease of autonomy
of EU law," 6 this comparison of the legal diplomacy demonstrates that through its
balancing the SCOTUS asserted its role as the arbiter in conflicts between the political
branches, while the CJEU similarly stabilized a supranational architecture designed to
maintain peace and trust among its Member States.
Scholars working on international courts often argue that legal diplomacy is one
of the constitutive features enabling international courts to navigate law and politics
while conserving their institutional authority7 The initial balancing of European Court
of Human Rights was between "giving life" to the European Convention on Human
Rights and "ensuring its viability" through Member States' acceptance by developing
a legal rationality that would ensure the self-preservation of the Court. Legal
diplomacy is not a concept foreign to EU scholars in particular either, since from the
1970s onwards the European Court of Justice (ECJ) balanced questions of
competences both internally and externally, 8 which required similar legal reasoning
accommodating EU rights with domestic mandatory interests while ensuring the selfpreservation of a supranational constitutional court.9 In expanding its jurisdiction over
foreign relations law, the CJEU carefully interpreted the Union's competences and

2 See Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European
Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 32 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 137, 139 (2007).

s See RONAN FARROW, WAR ON PEACE: THE END OF DIPLOMACY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN

INFLUENCE (2018).
4 See Michael Pettis, Why Trade Wars are Inevitable, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 19, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/19/trade-wars-inevitable-us-china-economic-imbalances/.

s See Duncan Kennedy, PoliticalIdeology and Comparative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION

TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
6 See Jed Odermatt, The Principle of Autonomy: An Adolescent Disease of EU External Relations
Law? in STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 291 (Marise Cremona ed., 2018).
7 See Mikael Rask Madsen,
The Narrowing of the European Court of Human Rights: Legal
Diplomacy, Situational Self-Restraint and the New Vision of the Court, EUR. CONVENTION ON HUM. RTS.

L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1); Henrik Palmer Olsen, International Courts and the Doctrinal
Channels of Legal Diplomacy (iCourts Working Paper Series, Paper No. 25, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2607925 ("[I]t is precisely the sensitivity to politics per se that allows ICs to
transcend the political and build their own specific interpretations of what international law requires. This
means that ICs - through their case law - construe specific legal understandings of what international law
means and how it should be applied. They become, in a sense, masters of international law, by navigating
through political resistance with the only tool available to them: interpretation of the law.").
s See KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001); EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW -

FUNDAMENTALS (Marise Cremona & Bruno de Witte eds., 2008).
9 See Madsen, supra note 7 (manuscript at 2).
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navigated the changing global role of the EU after the Cold War.10 Recent judgements
at the intersection of EU external relations laws, namely Common Foreign and
Security Policy ("CFSP") and Common Commercial Policy ("CCP"),"I exemplify
how in each case the court filled gaps in the EU Treaty while expanding or refraining
from asserting its jurisdiction in foreign relations.I1
This CJEU jurisprudence allows new repeat players, such as the European
Parliament (EP), to promote the democratization of CFSP, while making sure that the
EU decisions in this area fully take into account basic fundamental rights guarantees
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 13 In addition, new litigants seek
to bring their cases to Luxembourg as part of their international litigation strategies.
Those include unusual applicants such as the lawyers of the Polisario Front1 -a
liberation movement of Western Sahara-or Rosneft 15-a Russian oil company that
most likely would be unable to find a remedy to such wrongs before domestic courtsand Achmea-a Dutch insurance company investing in Slovakia claiming a remedy
under an intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty.1 6
The EU is facing unprecedented external and internal challenges to its legal and
political-economic structure. This includes the need to rethink its global trade and
investment agenda that is inevitably tied to migration fluxes and a lack of economic
development and political stability in Northern Africa." The EU is also facing an
internal rule of law crisis with the rise of authoritarian governments calling themselves
"illiberal democracies." 18 In these instances, the legal diplomacy of the CJEU initially
aimed at strengthening its authority to enforce the rule of law in EU foreign relations
is now re-focused to maintain democratic and political stability inside the Union.
However, legal diplomacy is not exclusive to supranational Courts. Supreme and
constitutional courts, as part of an independent judiciary, also engage in legal
diplomacy when intervening in foreign relations crises prompted by military or trade
wars. Take for instance the SCOTUS, when soon after the ratification of the United
10 See Marise Cremona, The Union as Global Actor: Models and Identity, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV.

553 (2004).
" See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the
European Union and the Republic of Singapore - Allocation of competences between the European Union
and the Member States, Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992.
12 See NF v. Eur. Council, Case T-192/16, EU:T:2017:128 (rejecting the jurisdiction of the General
Court on the EU-Turkey deal).
's See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 82-86, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 0.J. (C 326)
1 [hereinafter TFEU] ("The Areas of freedom, security and justice is a collection of home affairs and justice
policies addressing security, judicial cooperation in criminal matters.").
14 See Council v. Front Polisario, Case C-104/16P, EU:C:2016:973.
15 See PJSC Rosneft Oil Co. v. Her Majesty, Case C72/15, EU:C:2017:236 [hereinafter Rosneft].
16 SlovakRepublic v. Achmea BV Case C-284/16, EU:C2018:158.
17 See PEO HANSEN

& STEFAN JONSSON, EURAFRICA: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION AND COLONIALISM (2014); Daniela Caruso & Joanna Geneve, Melki in Context: Algeria and
European Legal Integration, in EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN
JURISPRUDENCE (Bill Davies & Fernanda Nicola eds., 2017); European Commission's Trade for All.
Towards a More Responsible
Trade Strategy (2015), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/

2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.
18 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary's ConstitutionalRevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
111,111-12 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pal Sonnevend eds.,
2015); Miklos Bankuti et al., Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138
CRJSJSJNTHEEUROPEANCONSTTUTONALAREA

(2012).
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States Constitution, it played a crucial role in foreign policy by preserving the
country's neutrality in the war between Britain and France while giving life to the US
Constitution.19 Since then, however, the SCOTUS only indirectly exercised its legal
diplomacy as its self-preservation was based its "mythical neutrality."20 But the
renewed focus of the Rehnquist Court on national security and foreign affairs,
particularly through the national combatant cases, prompted a return to a legal
diplomatic role of the Court that some viewed as a questionable expansion of the
judiciary's role in such issues. 1
The judicial evolution in foreign relations doctrines looks fairly similar in both
the SCOTUS and the CJEU. This is despite the very different timeframe and
institutional constraints that the two courts operate under, such as the EU's lack of a
strong President or national army, and the nomination of the CJEU's twenty-seven
judges by the executives of the Member States confirmed by a panel of experts, rather
than nine Justices nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. But
much like its SCOTUS counterpart, over the past fifty years the CJEU exercised legal
diplomacy through activism or judicial restraint in EU foreign relations to establish its
own authority in this realm.2 2 Overall, the CJEU shaped important aspects of EU
foreign policy 23 by re-defining the nature of its internal and international obligations
regarding human rights, 4 international trade,25 investment agreements, 26 and rule of
law from the perspective of judicial independence and effective remedies.2 7
Through a functional comparison of legal diplomacy, namely the foreign relations
jurisprudence of the SCOTUS and the CJEU, this Article highlights similarities in the
use of legal doctrines, policy arguments and legal processes that enhance or discourage
the judicialization of foreign relations through judicial activism of deference. In
deploying doctrines concerning political questions, separation of powers, and
federalism in treaty-making authority, both courts are exerting or retraining their legal
diplomatic skills by walking the fine line of law and politics. Even though critics of
the CJEU's legal diplomacy call this jurisprudence an inappropriate expansion of
judicial power, 28 courts inevitably embed foreign relations into rule of law reasoning
19 See David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons From the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS L. J. 145, 153-58

(2008).
20

See J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe 100 YALE L. J., 2403, 2426-30 (1991).

21

See John Hoo, National Security and the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1144, 11604

(2006).
22 For activism, see Commission v. Council, Case 22-70, EU:C:1971:32 [hereinafter ERTA] and
Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the
Protection of Intellectual Property, Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384, and for restraint, see Jed Odermatt,

Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International Courts. 14, INT'L J. L. CONTEXT 221

(2018).
23 See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW (Manse Cremona & Anne

Thies eds., 2014); see also PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW (2d ed. 2011).
24 Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU-Draft International Agreement-Accession
of the
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms-Compatibility of the Draft Agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13,
EU:C:2014:2454.
25 Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384 (discussing the competence of the EC to conclude WTO agreements
on GATS and TRIPs).
26 Slovak Republic, EU:C:2018:158; Opinion 1/17 on CETA, EU:C:2019:341.
27 See Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236, ¶¶ 6243.
28 See Perry Anderson, The European Coup, 42 LONDON REV. BOOKS (2020).
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and open the debate to a multiplicity of legal and civil society actors to increase their
legitimacy. With the rising wave of autocratic leaders and populist political parties
advocating for more Brexit, NATO withdrawal, and with tensions rising inside the
Union over the entrenchment of a liberal rule of law, the legal diplomacy of the CJEU
ought to be reappraised as another legal barrieragainst the authoritarianism alongside
its increasing need of institutional self-preservation evident in the formalism and
deference arising from its own reasoning. 29
Part I of this Article addresses literature on the increasing judicialization of
politics by focusing on the judicial empowerment of the SCOTUS and the CJEU visa-vis foreign relations. 30 A functional comparison between the SCOTUS and the CJEU
elucidates how, despite different historical contexts and federal or supranational
constitutional constraints, these two courts use similar doctrinal, interpretative, and
legal process tools to engage in or refrain from exercising legal diplomacy "without
putting the authority of the concerned court in peril." 31 While in the US the notion of
foreign relation exceptionalism has displaced the legal diplomacy exercised by the
SCOTUS through the prerogative of the executive branch in international relations, in
the EU, due to its supranational features including a less rigid separation of powers
and federalism doctrines, the CJEU has deployed legal diplomacy not only in its
external but increasingly in its internal relations.
In Part II, this Article shows how the judicialization of foreign relations arose
before the SCOTUS and the CJEU through doctrinal interpretation of separation of
powers doctrines with different ideological visions on the role of the judiciary. While
the Act of State doctrine constrains the SCOTUS from engaging directly in foreign
affairs, the Political Question doctrine allows the SCOTUS to judicialize foreign
relations indirectly by shaping the powers of the other political branches. In the EU, a
similar tension arose between the judicial avoidance of the CJEU, 32 and its
involvement in foreign relations by crafting its autonomy of EU law as a way to
preserve its authority rather than openly exercising judicial diplomacy. 33
Part III engages with federalism in foreign relations by comparing the SCOTUS
jurisprudence on non-self-executing treaties to the mixed agreements jurisprudence of
the CJEU. In both contexts, the courts engage in legal diplomacy by balancing two
conflicting considerations leading to deference or activism in foreign relations. In one
consideration, the exceptionalism in foreign relations leads to judicial restraint and
29 See Madsen, supra note 7 (manuscript at 27) (showing how the evolution of the legal diplomacy of
the ECtHR facing new challenges to its authority has created a new subsidiarity approach granting more
deference to the Member States and a differentiated legal rationality with more situated self-restraint by the

Court).
s See Celmer, Case C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586; Associagao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses v.

Tribunal de Contas, Case C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117; Commission v. Poland, Case C-192/18,
EU:C:2019:924; Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531.
s' Mikael Rask Madsen, Bolstering Authority by Enhancing Communication: How Checks and
Balances and Feedback Loops Can Strengthen the Authority of the European Court of Human Rights, in
ALLOCATING AUTHORITY 13 (Joana Mendes & Ingo Venzke eds., 2018).
32 Odermatt, supra note 23.
" See Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; for a favorable commentary, see Daniel Halberstam, 'It's the
Autonomy, Stupid!' A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way
Forward, 16 GERMAN L.J. 105 (2015) and for a critical view, see Piet Eeckhout, Opinion 2/13 on EU
Accession to the ECHR and JudicialDialogue:Autonomy or Autarky, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 955 (2015).
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greater power to the federal/executive branch in foreign relations. Against this, the
courts weigh the judicialization of foreign relations and their greater involvement in
balancing states versus federal interests in international investments and commercial
policies.
Part IV addresses the increasing relevance of judicial independence in an era of
crisis of liberal constitutional democracies around the globe. 34 The example of Poland
provides a perfect case-study to show how capturing the judiciary was at the center of
the Polish governing coalition's strategy. 35 However, the intervention of the CJEU
slowed authoritarian momentum in Poland where the government is using all means
to attempt to run afoul of judicial independence. 36 In this struggle the CJEU chose the
path of legal diplomacy: rather than engaging politically like the European Parliament
or the Commission through art. 7 TEU against Poland and Hungary, it applied new
legal doctrines and procedural tools, such as injunctions, to gradually push the
government towards compliance with EU standards. The CJEU engaged with the
Polish government to entrench the notions of effective judicial remedies and judicial
independence in its uniform jurisprudence that constitutes the liberal European rule of
law. The increasing tension with the judicial nationalism emerging in the
Constitutional Courts of its Member States, 37 has led the CJEU to exercise greater
caution and deference to preserve its institutional rile in the Union.
Although the CJEU jurisprudence faced accusations of being too ideological, 38 or
not doing enough to curb the autocrats, 39 the Court is entrenching a liberal rule of law
culture both outside and inside the Union. This Article concludes that, through its legal
diplomacy, the CJEU worked towards the gradual entrenchment of rule of law
doctrines first established in its foreign relations to then deploy them against the
authoritarian threats inside the Union. Additionally, the CJEU adjudication against the
autocrats created new important evidence of why and how authoritarian governments
are violating EU law that gives the Commission the ability to request interim
measures 0 or impose penalties and financial conditionalities to uphold the rule of law

34 See CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (M. Graber et al. eds., 2018).
s See WOJCIECH SARDURSKI, POLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).
36

See Vanessa Gera, Judgesfrom Across EuropeMarch to DefendPolish Peers, TIME (Jan.
11, 2020),

https://apnews.com/article/6c1a837596888897999c856d2fb879c9.
37 Katharina Pistor, Germany's Constitutional Court Goes Rogue, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 8,
2020),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/german-constitutional-court-ecb-ruling-maythreaten-euro-by-katharina-pistor-2020-05?barrier-accesspaylog; Gino Scaccia, The Lesson Learnedfrom
the Taricco Saga: JudicialNationalism and the ConstitutionalReview of E. U. Law 35 AM. U. INT'L LAW
REv. 821 (220); Daniele Gallo, Challenging EU ConstitutionalLaw: The Italian ConstitutionalCourt's
New Stance on Direct Effect and the PreliminaryReference Procedure, 25 EUR. L. . 434 (2019); Mikael
Rask Madsen et al., CompetingSupremacies and Clashing InstitutionalRationalities:The Danish Supreme
Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the NationalLimits of Judicial Cooperation, 23 EUR. L. J. 140

(2017).
38 See Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in ContemporaryAmerican Legal Thought,

25 L. & CRITIQUE 91 (2014).
s9 Armin von Bogdandy et al., Protecting EU Values - Reverse Solange and the Rule of Law
Framework in THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW AND VALUES, ENSURING MEMBER STATES' COMPLIANCE

218-33 (Andras Jakab & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2017).
4 See Laurent Pech, ProtectingPolish Judgesfrom the Ruling Party's "Star Chamber:" The Court
ofJustice 's InterimRelief Order in Commission v Poland(Case C-791/19 R), VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 9,

2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/protecting-polish-judges-from-the-ruling-partys-star-chamber/.
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standard.41 In an age of authoritarianism, the CJEU is cautiously walking a fine line
between law and politics with the certainty that its adjudication despite its formalism
and deference is likely to trigger the hermeneutics of suspicion by commentators4 2 and
political backlash from its Member States.4 3
PART I. COMPARING LEGAL DIPLOMACY
A.

Legal Diplomacy in the ECtHR and the CJEU

Legal diplomacy is a term first coined by Mikael Rask Madsen, describing the
work of the European Commission of Human Rights (predecessor of the Court,
ECtHR) in the Cyprus case as a very first occurrence of such diplomacy.4 4 Greece
brought suit against the United Kingdom concerning the rights of Greek insurgents in
Cyprus, which ended with a situation where the settlement of the legal dispute
happened via diplomatic means.4 5 In 1955, at the beginning of the European Human
Rights system, the Commission took a strategic decision not to take its case before the
Committee of Ministers, since this would have had severe negative consequences for
the human rights system at large, but instead it chose a "diplomatic agreement" that
allowed the preservation of the human rights system in Strasbourg.4 6 Legal diplomacy
was a legal, rather than political, strategy used by legal and political European experts
and soon became a basic premise in the institutional order laid out in the ECtHR.4 7
The legal strategy used by the Strasbourg Court to build its authority during the early
years of its existence was a continuous balancing of the preservation of its institutional
role, the tensions between different political powers, and the creation of new judicial
doctrines giving life to the European Convention of Human Rights. These doctrines
and discourses of a transnational court having to balance its jurisprudence against
considerations about its legitimacy and authority in an international, regional and
domestic setting constituted its legal diplomacy.
This use of law rather than politics to foster diplomatic relations and continue the
judicial dialogue among European and national governments constitutes the legal
diplomacy of the ECtHR as well as the CJEU in Luxembourg. These transnational
courts do not always operate through a pure form of legal reasoning nor as political
institutions, but rather these courts use legal diplomacy to walk a fine line between

41 See Hungary and Poland Threaten E. U. Stimulus Over Rule of Law Links, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2020); Parliament and Council Regulation 2020/2092, On a General Regime of Conditionality for the
Protection of the Union Budget 2020 0.J. L433I 1; see also Daniel Gros, The European Council's
Compromise on the Rule of Law Regulation, CTR. EUR. POL'Y STUD., https://www.ceps.eu/the-europeancouncils-compromise-on-the-rule-of-law-regulation-capitulation-to-the-forces-of-evil-or-misplacedexpectations/.
42 See Duncan Kennedy, A PoliticalEconomy of ContemporaryLegality in THE LAW OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY: TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE FUNCTION OF LAW (Poul Fritz Kjaer, ed., 2019).
4s See Mikael Rask Madsen et al., Backlash Against InternationalCourts:Explaining the Forms and
PatternsofResistance to InternationalCourts, 14 INT'L J. L. CONTEXT 197 (2018).

Madsen, supra note 33.
Id. at 12.
46 Id.
47 Mikael Rask Madsen, Legal Diplomacy: Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (Stefan-Ludwig Hofmann
ed., 2010).
44
4s
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law and politics.4 8 Here, legal, political, and moral reasoning merge into a unique form
of international conflict management.4 9 In action, legal diplomacy is a form of selfreflexive legal reasoning for which courts are responsive to inputs from parties subject
to their international or supranational jurisdiction. 50 Because of the gap between the
supranational and the domestic legal order, these courts use transnational scaling to
leave room for a number of different ways for member states to adapt to international
or EU law. For example, leaving a margin of discretion to states for the ECtHR or
using proportionality in CJEU judgements on free movement allows these courts to
exercise restraint vis-a-vis the decisions made by member state authorities in a way
that judiciaries in federal systems are well aware of.51 This shows how legal diplomacy
is a careful mix of activism and constraint by courts trying to preserve their authority
inside and their legitimacy outside their jurisdiction.
According to Henrik Palmer Olsen, there is a variety of tools through which these
actors exercise their legal diplomacy that can be mapped through a plethora of judicial
strategies.52 For instance, self-restraint allows courts to build confidence between the
member state governments and the ECtHR. This concept of legal diplomacy can be
extended also to the ECJ in its internal relation to the EU member states and its very
early engagement with international law as part of its foreign relations.5 3 Through
autonomous concept formation these courts can assert their legal identity, so that
through the well-known cases establishing the supremacy in Costa and the direct effect
in Van Gend en Loos of EU law, the CJEU could create a culture of self-identity.54 By
using legal precedents and stare decisis, courts refer to prior decisions to support new
legal decisions, building consistency and therefore stability and authority.55 Creating
greater access for litigants to European courts through rules on standing and thirdparty intervention, and addressing institutional bottlenecks related to caseload, allows
parties who have not previously had standing to bring their cases to court. 56 By
adjudicating questions of individual rights, supranational courts directly impact
European citizens' fundamental or mobility rights so that courts' judgements have
tangible effects on those who have been mobilized through judicial action.57

48 Olsen, supra note 7.
49 Id.
s Id.
51 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
52 See Olsen, supra note 7.
s See Anne McNaughton, Acts of Creation: The ERTA Decision as a Foundation Stone of the EU
Legal System, in EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEANJURISPRUDENCE

134 (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies eds., 2017).
54 See Olsen, supra note 7.
s Id.
56 See Roberto Mastroianni & Andrea Pezza, Striking the Right Balance: Limits on the Right to Bring
an Action under Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the Functioningof the European Union, 30 AM. U. INT'L

L. REV. 743 (2015).
57 See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
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From Judicialto Legal Diplomacy in the CJEU

The book by Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World revamped the focus on
judicial diplomacy 58 that is the ongoing transnational dialogue among domestic, 59
international, and supranational courts. 60 Judicial diplomacy advances the migration
of constitutional ideas 61 and shows how judicial comparativism, when judges cite or
compare ideas or doctrines in different jurisdictions, can be a powerful form of
diplomacy for courts. 62 Comparative scholars highlight how international or domestic
courts are in permanent dialogue with foreign judges to consolidate their courts'
national authority within their own internal legal hierarchies,63 or to promote
exchanges of ideas that might end up influencing the constant evolution of judicial
lawmaking. 64 An empirical study of the Canadian Supreme Court demonstrated how
its constant exchange between foreign courts and individual judges impacted
"Canada's global reputation and foreign policy." 65 This form of judicial diplomacy
appears prominently in the work of Supreme Court justices like Stephen Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who are committed to using comparative experiences to inform
their legal reasoning. 66 Notably, a 2017 encounter in Washington, D.C. between
Associate Justice Stephen Breyer of the SCOTUS and President Koen Lenaerts of the
CJEU 67 prompted a discussion on how to advance a global rule of law through such

judicial dialogues. 68
In addition to judicial diplomacy, these courts also engaged with legal diplomacy
that is different yet influenced by this judicial dialogue through which transnational
courts develop specific doctrines, discourses, and processes in the realm of foreign
relations law. The judgments of the CJEU at the intersection of Common Foreign and
Security Policy ("CFSP"), Common Commercial Policy ("CCP"), and human rights
conditionality exemplify the distinctive role that the CJEU plays by filling gaps in the
EU Treaty while expanding the court's role in EU foreign relations. While the EU is
facing unprecedented internal and external challenges, ranging from Brexit to rule of
law crises in Hungary and Poland, the revamping of Russian tensions and a migration

58

STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD (2016).
s9 See Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International

Impact of the Rehnquist Court 34 TULSA L. J. 15, 23-26 (1998).
60 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L. J. 487 (2005).
61

See SUJIT CHOUDHRY, THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (2008).

62 See David Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2015).
63
See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST GERMANY'S

CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-79 (2012).
64

See

RAN

HIRSCHL,

COMPARATIVE

MATTERS:
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RENAISSANCE

OF

COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014). But see Armin von Bogdandy, Comparative Constitutional Law As a Social
Science? A Hegelian Reaction to Ran Hirschl's Comparative Matters, MAx PLANCK INST. RES. PAPER
SERIES 2016-09.
65 See Kloadian Rado, The JudicialDiplomacy of the Supreme Court of Canada and Its Impact: An
Empirical Overview, 58 ALTA. L. REV. 1 (2020).
" See THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN COURT DECISIONS (2005).
67 See Keon Lenarts & Stephen Breyer, Judges as Diplomats in Advancing the Rule of Law: A
Conversation with PresidentKoen Lenaerts andJustice Stephen Breyer, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1159 (2017).
68 See id.; Allan F. Tatham, Off the Bench But Not Off Duty: The JudicialDiplomacy of the Court of
Justice, 22 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 303 (2017).
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crisis, the CJEU is using legal diplomacy to maintain a legal and political order outside
and inside the EU.
Legal diplomacy is one of international courts' constitutive features, described as
a self-reflexive form of legal reasoning that is responsive to inputs from those subject
to legal regulation. 69 It is this diplomatic rationale that underpins a strategy that makes
it possible for courts to build and sustain the trust that is necessary for the courts to
become institutions in their own right, i.e. as institutions with their own will and their
own rationality.70 Or to put it more emphatically:
"it is precisely the sensitivity of politics per se that allows courts to
transcend the political and build their own specific interpretations of
what international law requires. This means that-through their case
law-international courts construe specific legal understandings of
what international law means and how it should be applied. They
become, in a sense, masters of international law, by navigating
through political resistance with the only tool available to them:
interpretation of the law." 1
In the case of the CJEU, its legal diplomacy in the past fifteen years instantiates
three elements, which all trace their origins to Opinion 2/13, one of its most-criticized
judgements, on the interplay between EU law and international human rights
protections under the European Convention of Human Rights of the Council of
Europe.7 2 First, in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13, in which the CJEU denied the
accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights, a gap in human
rights protection appeared in foreign relation powers that are not subjected to the
jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 24 TFEU. 73 If the EU were to accede to the
European Convention of Human Rights, this gap would have opened up the possibility
for the European Parliament to review the human rights violations in EU law
provisions. Opinion 2/13 held that the autonomy of EU law with respect to its Member
States and international law was part of its very nature,7 4 while the Court further
attempted to close jurisdictional gaps through gradual expansion of its jurisdiction in
Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) when reviewing the legality of restrictive
sanctions against individuals in the implementation of EU policies.
Secondly, there are other actors such as the European Parliament that became
adamant promoters of "democratizing" EU international relations by not only making
sure that EU decisions in this area fully take into account its advisory or co-decision
role after Lisbon, 75 but, more importantly, some basic fundamental rights guarantees

See Olsen, supra note 7.
70 See Madsen, supra note 49, at 62-68.
71 See Olsen, supra note 7.
72 See Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; and for a comment, Piet Eeckhout, Opinion 2/13 on EU
Accession to the ECHR andJudicialDialogue:Autonomy or Autarky, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 955 (2015).
73 See TFEU, supra note 14, art. 24(1-2).
74 See Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; Editorial, The EU's Accession to the ECHR - A "No" From
69

the ECJ!, 52 COMvON MKT. L. REV. 1 (2015).
75 The Lisbon Treaty in 2010 in article 218 TFEU expanded the role of the EP in the approval of
international treaties. See JUAN SANTOS VARA & SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ-TABERNERO, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THROUGH EU LAW (2018).
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in the area of freedom, security, and justice. 76 New litigants have sought to bring their
cases to Luxembourg as part of their litigation strategies by seeking standing for
"unusual applicants" including an annulment action of a Council decision through
Article 263 TFEU for the lawyers of the Polisario Front,77 a liberation movement of
Western Sahara and a preliminary reference through Article 267 TFEU from
Rosneft, 78 a Russian Oil Company that most likely were unable to find a remedy to
such wrongs before domestic courts.
Third, legal diplomacy coming from the CJEU is impactful beyond its important
role as a gap-filler for EU international agreements. Even more impressive is the role
of the Court as the arbiter in exercising scrutiny on the large discretion in foreign
relations retained by the Council of Ministers (hereinafter Council). 79 In particular, the
Court adamantly defends its role as the ultimate arbiter in the application of EU
constitutional law in foreign relations while at the same time securing the "strict
observance" of international law principles and departing from it in its Kadi
jurisprudence in tension with international law.80
The CJEU has given new interpretative guidance in foreign relations, trade and
international investment law81 as well as the compatibility between EU constitutional
and international law.82 The legal diplomacy of the CJEU has included in its balancing
international law principles, creating an important continuity in the Court's legal
reasoning which consolidates the Court's authority both outside and inside the Union.
In fact, its judgments on the respect to judicial independence in Poland, 83 and in
Hungary, 84 the Court has relied on its foreign relations jurisprudence, international law
concepts and applied them internally. In doing so, the CJEU exercised some of its
legal diplomatic skills through a gradual denunciation of authoritarian regimes inside
and outside the EU.
C.

From Legal Diplomacy to Exceptionalism in U.S. ForeignRelations

Legal historians have shown how in the 1790s, the U.S. Supreme Court served an
important diplomatic role adjudicating privateering acts against American ships and
impressment of their crews, as was common by the British and French navies. 85 As
See TFEU, supra note 14, art. 82-86 (addressing judicial cooperation in criminal matters).
See Council v. Front Polisario, EU: C:2016:973.
78 See Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236.
79 See Western Sahara Campaign UK v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affair, Case C-266/16, EU:C:2018:118.
76
7

80 See Grainne De Btrca, The EU, the European Courtof Justice and the International Legal Order
After Kadi, 1 HARV. INT'L L. J. (2009); Joris Larik, A Line in the Sand: The 'Strict Observance" of
International Law in the Western Sahara Case, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (March 2, 2018),

https://verfassungsblog.de/a-line-in-the-sand-the-strict-ob servance-of-international-law-in-the-we sternsahara-case/.
81 See Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992.
82
83

See Western Sahara Campaign UK, EU:C:2018:118, supra note 81.
See WOJCIECH SARDURSKI, POLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).

84 See Gabor Halmai, The Early Retirement Age of the Hungarian Judges, in EU LAW STORIES:
CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davis
eds., 2017); The Coup Against ConstitutionalDemocracy. The Case of Hungary, in CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (M. Graber et al. eds., 2018).
85 See DAVID L. SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE

(2011).
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David Sloss explains, privateering under foreign colors was not criminal, so
consequently owners of ships sought restitution damages in U.S. courts so that these
disputes were litigated judicially rather than diplomatically. 86 Although Congress did
not explicitly grant federal courts jurisdiction to handle private claims between
aggrieved Americans and foreign ships or crewmembers, 87 U.S. citizens routinely
brought suits on two grounds: that the foreign privateer vessels were illegally
"outfitted" or that the captain or crew of these ships were American. 88 As a result,
Sloss shows how a strict separation of powers in foreign relations was not what the
Founders had in mind and federal courts worked together with the national
government to "promote US foreign policy objectives." 89
For instance in Betsey (1794), the SCOTUS decided a case concerning a Swedish
ship captured by French privateers. 90 Although treaty law prohibited U.S. court
jurisdiction in cases involving French respondents, the owner of the ship brought suit
before a federal district court to determine his rights. 91 The French state protested this
act, recommending that the owner turn to a French consulate-operated prize court to
determine restitution. 92 The Supreme Court held that such prize courts could not
operate on American soil, leaving that jurisdiction exclusively to U.S. federal courts. 93
The French saw this sort of claim as one between states, thereby being subject to
treaties and diplomacy.94 The SCOTUS held, however, that these are actually private
suits brought between citizens; therefore, the courts were the best avenue for legal
recourse. 95 After Betsey, the federal executive acquiesced to this notion, rejecting
French protests against U.S. jurisdiction. 96
A few years later in Perseverance (1797), a British ship was captured by the Sans
Pareil, a French privateer vessel. 97 Following capture, with a new crew (placed by the
Sans Pareil), the Perseverance docked in Rhode Island, at which point the British
Consul of Rhode Island wrote a letter to the state's governor asking the ship to be
returned to its owner. 98 The governor seized the ship until the dispute's settlement.99
After learning of the situation, the French ambassador to the United States wrote a
letter to the Secretary of State, complaining about frivolous lawsuits filed against
legally captured vessels. 10 Ultimately, at the urging of the Secretary of State, the
Governor of Rhode Island ordered the release of the Perseverance to its French
captors. 01 However, federal marshals again seized the Perseverance after the federal

se Sloss, supra note 20, at 149.
87 Id. at 184.

88 Id.
89
Id. at 151.
90 Glass v. The Betsey, 3 U.S. 6 (1794).
9' Id.

92 Sloss, supra note 20, at 160 (2008).

9s Id.
9n Id. at 161.
9s Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 188.
9s Id.
99 Id. at 189.
io Id.
101 Id. at 190.
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judiciary became involved to avoid a separation of powers crisis with the executive
branch.102
Through these cases, the Supreme Court sought to limit U.S. jurisdiction by
applying international treaties, however, federal courts could not be held back from
deciding whether the terms of the treaty purporting to bar jurisdiction was applicable.
To avoid war with Britain and France, the federal executive branch supported French
claims of prize ships privateered in the Atlantic and Caribbean. The Supreme Court
limited authority originally intended under treaties, not by challenging their content,
but by emphasizing that the judiciary could decide whether those contents apply to the
particular case at hand, a technique central to the legal diplomatic role of the SCOTUS.
Today, this legal diplomatic role of the SCOTUS has almost disappeared
especially due to a common understanding of foreign affairs exceptionalism or the
notion that "the federal government's foreign affairs powers are subject to a different,
and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that govern its
domestic powers." 10 3 In other words, the traditional view of separation of powers that
apply in the domestic field is different when foreign affairs are implicated, and
consequently the judiciary is even more constrained by separation of powers as
"immovable walls" 1 4 in foreign affairs cases than in domestic cases.
The Supreme Court decision setting forth this concept of exceptionalism is United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.10 5 In a controversy involving a
presidential embargo on selling weapons to Bolivia and Paraguay following a
Congressional resolution, the defendant, an arms dealer, argued the statute under
which they were being prosecuted was invalid because it delegated too much
"unfettered" discretion to the President. 106 The Court answered by describing the
"fundamental" differences between "the powers of the federal government in respect
of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs." 10
The Court heavily emphasized "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations" 108 and that, as a result, Congress should grant to the President "a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved." 109 Here lies the general idea of foreign affairs
exceptionalism where, in contrast to internal matters, the President has independent
power in foreign affairs until derogated by Congress. And while courts should defer
to political branches, the SCOTUS has the power to interpret the boundaries between
these branches.
To some scholars, the idea of foreign affairs exceptionalism goes back to the
Framers, who valued both the knowledge and the ability to speak in one voice in

102 Id.

ios What is foreign relations law?, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2018).

104 But see
105 Id.
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David Sloss, supra note 20, at 150-51.
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foreign affairs. 1" As Curtis Bradley put it, "the executive branch has more expertise
and access to relevant information relating to foreign affairs than the other branches
of government and that it is desirable for the United States to speak with "one voice"
in foreign affairs where possible." 111 This approach has been supported by the fact that
historically foreign affairs were non-parliamentary affairs in which the role of
Congress should be limited and the courts should defer to the political branches.1 2
Even if the involvement of Congress in international treaty-making is constitutionally
required,1 3 the extent to which the legislative branch should be involved in foreign
relations remains a contested question with some scholars asking for more
Congressional involvement. 1 4 In either scenario, the legal diplomatic role exercised
by SCOTUS since the eighteenth century until today has changed radically. In fact,
from having an active role in shaping US foreign relations, the SCOTUS has become
a less obvious, yet still relevant actor in foreign affairs by defining the powers and
drawing the boundaries between the political branches.
PART II. COMPARING SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
This Part draws on the literature on the judicialization of international relations to
conceptualize the different elements of legal diplomacy in the reasoning of the
SCOTUS and CJEU. 15 By borrowing the methodology from political scientists, this
Article maps the legal doctrines, processes and policy arguments that enable or contain
the judicialization of foreign relations in the SCOTUS and the CJEU by favoring
judicial deference or intervention in foreign affairs.
Despite the different timeframe and institutional constraints, the comparison of
the legal diplomacy of the SCOTUS and the CJEU allows for an analytical
understanding of judicial trends and reasoning of the two courts in interpreting similar
doctrines with opposite ideological orientations. This part shows how the SCOTUS
and the CJEU have interpreted the doctrine of separation of powers in the context of

110 See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away From
"Exceptionalism", 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294 (2015);. For the origin of the definition, see Curtis A. Bradley,
A New American ForeignAffairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1999); see also THE FEDERALIST

No.75 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision,
secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The very
complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies,
would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives,
and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to
obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a source of so great inconvenience and
expense as alone ought to condemn the project.").
"' Curtis Bradley, What is foreign relations law?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 14 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2018).
12 See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the ConstitutionalRegime in Foreign Relations 85
VA. L. REV. 1 (1999); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965).
13 Louis Henkin, The Treaty-Makers and the Law Makers: The Law ofthe Land andForeignRelations,
107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959).
114 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'End: The Past, Present, and Future ofInternational Lawmaking
in the United States, 177 YALE L. J. 1236 (2008); see also Daniel Bessner & Stephen Wertheim,
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"5 See Karen J. Alter et al., Theorizing the Judicialization of InternationalRelations, 63 COURTS
WORKING PAPER SERIES; INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 449-63 (2019).
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foreign relations in two opposite ways. While the first column traces the doctrines,
processes and policy arguments according to a Right (R) ideology favoring the nonjudicial involvement of courts as neutral umpires, the second one traces the Left (L)
trend, namely the judicial intervention by redefining the roles of the political branches.
In either column, courts balance conflicting policy arguments in foreign relations,
which involve their internal authority and their external legitimacy. In doing so courts
exercise legal diplomacy, by advancing the judicialization of foreign relations law,
albeit through different ideological and legal strategies.
Each column offers an opposite vision of what legal diplomacy should entail with
respect to the legal reasoning the SCOTUS and the CJEU. In the first column, courts
should refrain from becoming active or visible players in the foreign relations disputes.
In contrast, they should stay in the background and police the boundaries of foreign
affairs intervention of other political branches. In the second column, courts become
active participants in foreign affairs, so that their judicial deference shapes the
outcomes of foreign relations disputes by assessing and balancing the roles of the other
political branches.
Table 1. Comparing Legal Diplomacy: Separation of Powers

Separation
of Powers

Non-Judicial Involvement in Foreign
Relations

Judicialization of
Foreign Relations

(R)

(L)

US Act of State

US PoliticalQuestions

EUJudicialAvoidance
Separation of Powers

EU JudicialDeference
InstitutionalBalance

"

Exceptionalism in FR

"

Different Judicial Treatment
Internal vs. External Affairs

"

Relaxed
Judicial
Scrutiny
for
Executive Prerogative in External
Affairs

"

Expertise of Executive Branch

"

Timeliness, efficiency in FR

"

Neutrality of Judicial Branch

"

Autonomy of EU
International Law

Policy
Arguments

law

"

NonExceptionalism in
FR

"

Same Treatment of
Internal
vs.
External Affairs

"

Expanding
Parliamentary
in
Involvement
External Affairs

"

Transparency

"

Accountability

"

Democratization
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towards

of FR
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*

Political Nature of
Judicial Branch

*

Unity of EU law
towards
International Law

*

Judicial Restraint

*

Judicial Activism

*

Lack of Standing

*

Standing for New

*

Lack of Jurisdiction

*

Limiting Third Party Intervention

*

No Legal Opinions for SCOTUS

*

Judicial Avoidance

litigants
"

Expanding
Jurisdiction

*

Expanding Third
Party Intervention

*

CJEU
Opinions

*

Deference
to
political branches

Legal

PoliticalQuestions in Foreign Relations

This Part describes two alternative interpretations of separation of powers
doctrines by the SCOTUS and the CJEU in their foreign relations jurisprudence
according to opposite political ideologies: Right (R) and Left (L). The first section
compares the U.S. doctrine of Acts of State with the judicial avoidance of the CJEU
as they both point to non-judicial involvement in foreign relations. The second section
addresses the judicialization of foreign relations in U.S. political questions and EU
legal standing doctrines as an instance of deference through which the Courts have the
last say on the role and powers of other political branches.
1.

Act of State as Judicial Avoidance

Federal courts in the United States apply the Act of State doctrine, a common-law
principle that prevents courts from questioning the validity of a foreign country's
sovereign acts that take place within its own territory. 11 The SCOTUS first developed
this doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, holding that "every sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory." 117 At first thought, it seemed that the doctrine was embedded in
international concord and mutual consideration. The Supreme Court then rebutted this
basis in the notorious Sabbatino decision, where an American citizen argued that an
expropriation ordered by the Cuban government was in violation of customary

16 Bradley, supra note 105.

"7 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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international law. The Cuban government bank that recovered the product of the
expropriation, argued that the Act of State doctrine compelled the Court to assume the
validity of the expropriation because it was a foreign government act taken within its
own territory. The Court confirmed that view, and in his majority opinion, Justice
Harlan held that the doctrine was not in fact a matter of international sovereignty, but
that it was rather based on "constitutional underpinnings" in the concept of separation
of powers.118 The Court's rationale was that since the executive has broad power to
conduct foreign affairs with other nations, disputes arising from official acts of
sovereign countries could not be settled by the judiciary because it would interfere
with the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. 119 In other words, the Act of State
doctrine is "in part about avoiding judicial interference with the executive branch's
management of foreign relations."120
The Act of State doctrine lies at the crossroads of two rationales, namely
separation of powers and judicial avoidance. The latter is a significant tool of legal
diplomacy. Similar to the aforementioned judicial self-restraint put forward by Palmer
Olsen, avoidance is a technique that allows courts to shun from dealing with issues
that could interfere with foreign policy and remain within the court's scope of
authority.12 1 In the context of foreign relations, it enables the courts to avoid interfering
with the prerogatives of the executive and to abstain from influencing foreign affairs.
In EU constitutionalism, a similar doctrine to the Act of State emerged when the
CJEU developed the practice of avoidance to shun influencing EU foreign policy. The
most relevant example is the challenge of the EU-Turkey Statement before the General
Court. In October 2015, Turkey and the EU agreed on a joint action plan designed to
strengthen their cooperation on the flow management of Syrian nationals who enjoyed
temporary international protection due to the war in Syria. In the following months,
the governments of the EU Member States and of Turkey activated the plan. In March
2016, the European Council issued a press release stating the measures taken. The next
April, a Pakistani national claiming asylum in Greece sought an order of annulment
of the statement, arguing that that "the EU-Turkey statement was an act attributable to
the European Council establishing an international agreement." 122 The European
Council argued that the statement was not an agreement or treaty in the sense of Article
218 TFEU or Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The EU
and Turkey published statement was rather "the fruit of an international dialogue
between the Member States and Turkey and was not intended to produce legally
binding effects nor constitute an agreement or a treaty." 12 3
In taking the views of the European Council and relying on a textual
interpretation, the General Court held that the statement in question was not a
negotiated document by the EU as an international organization, but the product of
negotiations between Turkey and the EU Member States (MS) in their individual
18 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
Id.

19
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capacity as actors under international law.124 Similar to the Act of State reasoning, the
CJEU considered the statement an act among sovereign countries in which judicial
interference would encroach upon the executive prerogatives of the MS in conducting
their foreign relations. The Court refused to hear the challenge as it "[did] not have
jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an international agreement concluded by the
Member States." 1 5 In doing so, the Court replicated an abstention rationale analogous
to the Act of State doctrine. Scholars criticize the Court for not diving into the right
analysis, l26 as it should have reviewed the conclusion supported by AG Jacobs in a
1992 opinion focusing on the content and effects of judicial review. 27 But in
abstaining from adopting this analysis and deciding that it could not hear the case, the
General Court "used the avoidance technique, hiding the real issue at stake namely the
dubious consistency of the Statement with international and EU law." 128 As Enzo
Cannizzaro noted, "along this line, the General Court has bent the authority of the
European judicial system to the demands of realpolitik." 129 In other words, the General
Court used the avoidance technique to prevent influencing EU foreign relations and
contradicting the executives of the Member States represented in the Council,
displaying a strong example of judicial balancing or legal diplomacy.
2.

Political Questions as Judicial Deference

Eight years after the Sabbatino ruling, and relying upon its rationale, Justice
Brennan wrote an opinion in which the Court held "thatthe validity of a foreign act of
state in certain circumstances is a 'political question' not cognizable in our courts."130
The political question doctrine is a doctrine under which a court will exercise judicial
deference for a question that is more properly resolved by the other branches of
government because of its inherently political nature.131 The SCOTUS is no stranger
to this practice of judicial deference that has become a potent antidote to the charge
that judicial balancing is usurping legislative power. 132 Since its creation, SCOTUS
encountered limits regarding disputes on constitutional assignment between branches
of government, especially in adjudicating cases involving foreign relations.133

Id. ¶¶ 70-72.
Id. ¶ 73. The Court upheld the rule laid down in Spain v. Parliament and Council, Case C-146/13,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:298, ¶ 101.
126 See Enzo Cannizzaro, Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism - A Quick Comment on
NF v. European Council, 2 EUR. PAPERS 251 (2017).
127 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 16 December 1992, European Parliament
v
Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases C181/91 & C-248/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:271, ¶ 17 ("[T]he question whether the contested act constitutes an
act susceptible to judicial review depends on its content and effects and not on the description of it given in
the press release and in the draft minutes of the meeting at which it was adopted.").
128 See Enzo Cannizzaro, supra note 87.
124
125

129 Id.

13o
131

See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787 (1972).
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Courts and Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2017).
132 See Duncan Kennedy, Proportionalityand 'Deference'in Contemporary ConstitutionalThought,
in THE TRANSFORMATION OR RECONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 29-38, 42 (Sinina Rodin & Tamara Perisin eds.,

2018).
133 CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2015) (explaining

that in Marbury, Justice Marshall declared "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
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In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion, created a new
political question standard based on the notion that "the non-justiciability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of power." 134 Similar to the Act of
State doctrine, the political question doctrine was also justified on separation of
powers grounds. The use of this doctrine by U.S. courts throughout its existence is
viewed by constitutional law scholars as a means for the courts to maintain the
discretion over what should be adjudicated by them. 135 There are two different views
in such an assumption. On one hand, courts use the political question doctrine as an
avoidance technique when they choose not to adjudicate.136 On the other, courts use
the political question doctrine to decide whether judicial review should apply to
foreign affairs.1 37 Regarding the first view, similar to the Act of State doctrine, it
appears that the political question doctrine enables the judges to decide on the
appropriateness or inability of certain types of questions and controversies. 138
Exercising self-restraint or deference when they decide not to adjudicate is itself an
important instance of legal diplomacy due to the fact courts balance questions of
democratic accountability, external legitimacy and internal authority. 139 Concerning
the second view, by deciding that judicial review should not occur in foreign affairs
cases, the SCOTUS not only restrains itself, but also reasserts its legitimacy-and
consequently its authority-vis-a-vis the other branches of government by not
interfering with their actions on foreign relations. 14 In doing so, courts are enabling
the executive branch to conduct its foreign policies without direct interference but
mere judicial review, resulting in the resolution of conflicts between political branches
that are democratically accountable.141
Despite the fact that the CJEU never created a political question doctrine, there
are cases where analogous doctrines emerged.14 2 The most relevant is the Frente
Polisario case,l43 brought by a group of transnational lawyers and human rights
activists representing the liberation movement for Western Sahara created in 1973.144
Despite several UN resolutions recognizing the "inalienable right of the people in
Western Sahara to self-determination and independence" 145 and a peace agreement in

individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive can never be made in this court." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)).
134 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1s Stephen Ansolabchere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story ofBaker v. Carr, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
136

See Odermatt, supra note 123.

137 THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY
TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992).
138
139

See Odermatt, supra note 123.
See Olsen, supra note 7.

140 See

Odermatt, supra note 123.
141 See Karl Klare, CriticalPerspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy, and Separation
of Powers, in SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES (Helena Alviar

Garcia et al. eds., 2014).
142 Graham Butler, In Search of the Political Question Doctrine in EU Law, 45 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 329, 329-54 (2018).

143 Frente Polisario v. Council, Case T-512/12, EU:T:2015:953 [hereinafter Frente Polisario].
144 Id.
145 See THE EU APPROACH TOWARDS WESTERN SAHARA 11-31 (Marco Balboni & Giuliana Laschi
eds., 2017). The history of the Polisario Front is linked to the saga of the Sahrawi people who had to bear
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1976 between Morocco, Mauritania and Front Polisario, Morocco extended its
occupation to the territory which lead to an armed conflict ending in 1988.146
The Polisario Front brought an annulment action based on Article 263-64 TFEU
before the General Court to challenge the Council Decision 2012/497/EU liberalizing
agricultural products, fish, and fishery products and replacing some of the Annexes to
the Euro-Mediterranean agreement that established a trade agreement between the EU
and the Kingdom of Morocco. 147 This challenge was successful because the decision
of the General Court in December 2015 recognized standing to a rather unusual
applicant, the Frente Polisario, and partially annulled the Council decision in
question.14 8
The question of standing was the first hurdle for the Polisario Front in challenging
the Council Decision.14 9 With respect to whether the Polisario Front had standing in
EU law, the claimant needs to be 'directly and individually concerned' under TFEU
263-64.1so Both the Council and the Commission argued that the Polisario Front had
no standing since the Decision only concerned the Kingdom of Morocco and the EU.
Furthermore, the Council argued that the Decision did not have any control over what
happened with respect to the human rights situation in Western Sahara.l
The
Commission asserted that the Agreement only applied to products originating from
Morocco, which under international law does not include Western Sahara.15 2 The
Polisario Front counterclaimed that the Kingdom of Morocco de facto applied the

the consequences of a "rushed decolonization" by Spain, since subjected to Moroccan occupation, with a
large part of the population now forced to live in refugee camps in Algeria.
146 Through UN diplomacy, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front reached a cease -fire, but
a referendum for the self-determination of the Sahrawi population has never taken place and Morocco still
controls most of the territory in Western Sahara. Id. at ¶ 16.
147 See Geraldo Vidigal, Trade Agreements, EU Law, and Occupied Territories - A Report on
Polisario v Council, EUR. 1. INT'L L. BLOG (July 1, 2015) (evaluating the 2010 EU-Morocco Agreement on
agricultural, processed and fisheries products that is a development of the 2000 EU-Morocco Association
Agreement to Western Sahara stating "if applied the same way, the 2010 Agreement will facilitate the export
to the EU of Agricultural products grown in Sahrawi land and fish caught in Sahrawi waters").
148 The question of the standing of the Polisario Front as a natural or legal person under ¶ 4 of Article
264 TFEU is a central question because the claimants argue that its legal personality derives from public
international law as recognized by the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1979. The General Court
explains that even though an entity does not have a legal personality according to the legal order of a
Member State or a third country, due to its own constituting document, it has a fixed internal structure that
"enables it to act as a responsible body in legal relations" that has participated in UN negotiations and signed
an internationally recognized peace agreement with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Frente Polisario,
EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 44. In contrast, the Council argues that the personality of the liberation movement cannot
be equated to the one of the State and that even if it did have a legal personality this would not automatically
confer locus standi before the General Court to the Polisario Front. Even though the Commission supports
the status of the Polisario Front as representative of the Sahrawi people yet it argues that as far of its legal
personality should only be "functional and transitional." Id. ¶ 46.
149 See Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part,
2000 0.J. (L 70) 2 [hereinafter "The Agreement"].
oArt. 263 ¶ 4 states that "Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct
and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not
entail implementing measures." Id.
151 Frente Polisario, EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 74.
152 Id. ¶ 75.
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agreements concluded with the EU to Western Sahara where it exploited its natural
resources and thus violated the fundamental rights of its population.153
Even though the General Court held that there was not an absolute prohibition
under international law preventing the EU from entering into an agreement with a third
country when the Agreement might be applied to an occupied territory, 5 4 the Court
showed how there was a crucial gap in the Agreement. Namely, if the EU wished to
preemptively:
"[...]oppose the application to Western Sahara of the Association
Agreement, as amended by the contested decision, they could have
insisted on including a clause excluding such application into the
text of the agreement approved by that decision. The failure to do so
shows that they accept, at least implicitly, the interpretation of the
Association Agreement with Morocco and the agreement approved
by the contested decision, according to which those agreements also
apply to the part of Western Sahara controlled by the kingdom of
Morocco." 15
In examining the wide discretion of the Council to enter in the Agreement, the
General Court held that with respect to a trade agreement allowing the export of
product originating from the disputed territory:
"[the] Council must examine carefully and impartially, all the
relevant facts in order to ensure that the production of the goods for
export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the
territory or entails infringement of fundamental rights."15 6 In doing
so the Court established a limit for the discretion of the Council in
entering International Agreements that ought to carry out an impact
assessment to assess whether these would exploit the resources of
the territory at the detriments of the inhabitants of Western
Sahara. 157
In holding that the Council failed to "examine all the elements of the case before
the adoption of the contested decision," the General Court annulled the contested
decision. In doing so it relied on international law obligations by addressing the impact
of the agreement in Western Sahara. As argued by the claimant, this could result in an
"economic spoliation with the aim of altering the structure of the Sarahi society"158
and by, for instance, extracting water from non-renewable underground reservoirs. 159

153 Id. ¶¶ 77-80.
154 See Ricardo Passos, Legal Aspects of the European Union's Approach to Western Sahara, in
Balboni & Laschi, supra note 147, at 139 (2017). (explaining that this is a possible approach taken by some
scholars, whereas the EU has followed a different approach which recognizes both the status of Western
Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory as de facto under the Moroccan administration but for which a
distinction ought to be made between detrimental versus beneficial foreign economic investments following
the latest UN Resolution 50/3 3 of December 6, 1995).
1s Id. ¶ 102.
156 Id. ¶ 228.
7 Id. ¶ 241.
58 Id. ¶ 242.
159 Id. ¶ 241.
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Even further along this international law logic, according to the General Court, the
EU-Morocco Association and Liberalization Agreements in facilitating the export of
agricultural products coming from Western Sahara should also consider the
"potential" violation of international obligations 160 and human rights protections under
the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the third parties affected by such agreement. 161
This ruling triggered a diplomatic crisis between Morocco and the EU leading to the
interruption of their trade relations.
The Council appealed the General Court judgement before the CJEU, which
reversed it and denied the annulment action sought by the Polisario Front. 162 Soon
after the CJEU judgement reinstating the validity of the Council decision, Morocco
reestablished diplomatic relations with the EU. By neither entering the substance of
the case but in following the reasoning of the Advocate General ("AG") opinion,163
the CJEU made sure that the EU was not complicit in the de facto application of the
Agreement to Western Sahara to which it recognized an independent status according
to the principle of self-determination of international law.164 At the same time, the
CJEU followed the Commission's reasoning that if the Decision at stake was to apply
to Western Sahara this should have been explicitly mentioned in the text as a 'third
party' to an international agreement. 165 By the same token, the CJEU did not deny that
if the EU was aware that an international trade agreement had a de facto impact on
third countries from which goods are traded these could not be in violation of human
rights conditionalities, 166 however the Court only addresses the normative rather than
the factual context of the Decision. 167
3.

Balancing International Law

The legal diplomacy of the CJEU resulted in what on the surface seemed a mere
strict adherence to rules and principles of international law, while the Court expanded
its legal standing doctrine to the Polisario Front that claimed a partial victory in having
its legal personality recognized in Luxembourg. According to the AG opinion, the
Council had to perform impact assessments on trade agreements, especially when they

160 See Carlos Ruiz Miguel, The Principle, The Right of Self-Determination and the People of Western
Sahara, in THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TOWARDS WESTERN SAHARA 61 (2017).

161 See Eyal Benvenisti, The E.U. Must Consider Threats to Fundamental Rights of Non-E.U.
Nationals by Its Potential Trading Partners, TEL Aviv U.: GLOBAL TR. BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/the -e-u-must-consider-threats-to-fundamental-rights-of-non-eu-nationals-by-itspotential-trading-partners/ (citing ¶¶ 227-28 of the Frente Polisario case).
162 See Frente Polisario, EU:T:2015:953; Sam Edwards, Are Morocco and EU Heading Towards a
Political
Impasse?,
AL
JAZEERA
(Mar.
13,
2017),
http://www.aliazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/morocco-eu-heading-political-impasse170301102342685.html (quoting Markus Gehring-lecturer of law at the University Cambridge-"[t]he
European Court of Justice decision was kind of a pyrrhic victory for Morocco").
163 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Council v. Front Polisario, Case C-104/16 P,
EU: C:2016:677.
164 See Frente Polisario EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 86.
'

65

Id.

¶

103.

166 See Paivi Leino European Universalism? The EU and Human Rights Conditionality,24 Y.B. EUR.

L. 329 (2005).
167 See Enzo Cannizzaro, In Defence of FrontPolisario:The ECJ as a Global Jus Cogens Maker, 55
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 569, 578 (2008).
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have the knowledge that these are de facto coming from occupied territories. 168 The
AG's opinion in referring to the Ombudsman's decision in the Vietnam case goes even
to the point that nothing in the Council's hearing had good arguments for why they
should not take into account human rights implications of international trade
agreements vis-a-vis third parties. 169 The CJEU walked a fine line to create only a
slight obligation towards third parties not included in the international agreement.170
In mentioning the decision of the General Court, the CJEU narrowed the necessity to
carry out human rights assessments and recognized that the Council failed to fulfill
that obligation in what it defines as "disputed territories" only. 171
In 2018, a second round of a similar set of claims arrived before the CJEU through
a preliminary reference from the UK High Court. The Western Sahara Campaign in
support of the rights of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination opposed
the inclusion of the waters adjacent to Western Sahara in the EU-Morocco Fisheries
Partnership Agreement.172 In this case, the CJEU held that, unlike the Council, it had
the jurisdiction to examine the substance of the international law agreement to make
sure that the Council was in compliance with EU constitutional law. However, in
applying the Montego Bay convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of
international law, the Court found the agreement valid as the EU agreement excluded
the waters adjacent to Western Sahara. 173 As Alessandro Petti noticed, although the
CJEU relied on a formalist interpretation of international law, its change of posture
towards this body of law has shifted from a dualist notion centered on the "autonomy"
of EU law to a monistic notion of "unity" of EU law with international law. 174 These
dualist and monist interpretations have acquired a political salience in the reasoning
of the CJEU for which international law norms and principles have become conflicting
policy arguments in the balancing of the Luxembourg Court.
B.

DemocratizingEU ForeignRelations

The European Parliament ("EP"), over time, has asserted a growing role in EU
foreign relations by initially claiming its standing, lacking in the Treaties, to raise
annulment actions before the ECJ and against the Council. As a result of this growing
role of the EP as a co-equal political branch to the Council, the Lisbon Treaty, through
Article 218 TFEU, has created an enhanced role for the Parliament in the conduct of
foreign affairs. The democratization of EU law and eventually of EU foreign relations
168 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Council v. Front
Polisario, Case C-104/16 P,
EU:C:2016:677, ¶¶ 261-62.
169

Id.

170 See Daniela Caruso, Non-Parties: The Negative Externalitiesof Regional Trade Agreements in a

Private Law Perspective,59 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 389 (2018).
171 Frente Polisario, EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 47. As Geraldo Vidal claims, this obligation for the disputed
territory could become either a 'weak' duty through which an impact assessment will become merely a
rubber stamp for the EU to make sure that the agreements are not a source of a fundamental right violation
or a 'strong' duty whereby it could limit the discretion of the EU negotiating some international agreements.
Clearly the AG and the General Court seem to go in the latter direction than the one sought by the Council
and the commission in their appeal.

172 See Western SaharaCampaign UK, EU:C:2018:118.
73
1 Id. ¶¶75-81.
174 Alessandro Petti, The Polisario and WS Campaign Saga: An Evolution in the EU's Attitude

Towards InternationalLaw?, paper presented at the Joint ESIL IG 'EU as a Global Actor' - CLEER
Conference, the Asser Institute, The Hague (Dec. 11, 2019) (on file with the author).
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law has allowed the Court to exercise its activism in interpreting the doctrine of
separations of powers that in EU law translates as the principle of "institutional
balance" as intended by the Treaties.17 5
1.

Judicial Empowerment of the European Parliament

The most meaningful decisions that interpreted the text of Article 218 TFEU in
the Treaty of Lisbon are Roquette Freres17 6 and European Parliament v. Council
(Chernobyl).?? In the Roquette Freres case, the Council sent a regulation proposal to
Parliament and awaited its opinion. Parliament issued its opinion one month past than
the expected deadline and expressed its rejection of the regulation. By that time, the
Council adopted the regulation and a company subsequently brought an action against
the Council arguing that the regulation was void on the grounds that Council did not
consult Parliament. The Court held that the Council failed to properly consult
Parliament and that, although not binding, consultation of the Parliament was
mandatory. This ruling, given immediately after the first European elections in 1979,
ensured the important role of the elected institution in the legislative process and
opened the way for the enhancement of its role in foreign affairs decision making.
Eight years later, in the wake of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the European
Parliament sought the annulment of a Council regulation laying down maximum levels
of radioactive contamination of food products. Prior to that case, the EP had no
standing to bring annulment actions that created an obvious gap in the Treaty.178 In
Chernobyl, the EP argued that although it was consulted by the Council, it did not
agree with the legal basis adopted by the Commission, and asked the Commission to
submit a new legal basis entailing the cooperation between the EP and Council.179 The
Commission subsequently disregarded that opinion and the Council adopted the
regulation. The CJEU ruled that Parliament could bring proceedings for annulment if
limited to the purpose of protecting its prerogatives. In doing so, the CJEU recognized
the EP's right of action to challenge Council decisions based on separations of powers
arguments, namely that the institutions' prerogatives are "one of the elements of the
institutional balance created by the Treaties", and proceeded with a discussion about
the fundamental balance and distribution of powers between the different Community
institutions. 180 The Court ultimately found that notwithstanding any procedural gap
contemplated by the Treaties in granting the Parliament the affirmative power of
annulment, the "fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of the
institutional balance" must be preserved by the judicial review of the Court. 181 This
case has become one of the prime examples of judicial activism in EU law in which
the Court has allowed the EP to sue the Council while enabling the Court to exercise

175 See GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EU LAW 159 (4th ed. 2015).
176 SA Roquette Frees v. Council of the European Communities (Isoglucose), Case C-138/79,
EU:C:1980:249.
17 European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities, Case C-70/88, EU:C:1990:217.
18 European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities, Case C-302/87, EU:C:1988:461.
179 See European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities (Chernobyl), Case C-70/88,
EU: C:1990:217.
80
'
Id. ¶¶ 16-25.
'81 Id. ¶ 26.
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judicial review on EU law based on the respect of the rule of law and the principle of
institutional balance.
2.

The European Parliament's Struggle in Foreign Relations

Post-Lisbon, CJEU-induced democratization mainly concerned the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the EU-Mauritius controversy, the CJEU was
rather skeptical in engaging with international law and the role of the UN rather than
grounding its legal analysis in EU law.182 However, it overcame such skepticism in
the second case addressing the EU-Tanzania Agreement, in which both the Advocate
General and the CJEU showed much more confidence in interpreting international law
and in expanding the Court's jurisdiction in the realm of CFSP.18 3
In 2011, the European parliament brought a first action of annulment under
Article 263 TFEU against the Council of the European Union. This action disputed
Council Decisions 2011/620/CFSP on the Agreement between the EU and the
Republic of Mauritius concerning the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and
associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force (EUNVFOR, part
of the Atalanta operation).184
The EP argued that the Council Decisions should have involved the EP in its
adoption through either ordinary legislative procedure or by requiring the consent of
the EP according to Article 218 TFEU, 185 because the EU-Mauritius Agreement not
only related to CFSP, but also judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police
cooperation, and development cooperation falling under the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (AFSJ). Therefore, according to the EP the decisions fell under
Article 82 TFEU, including the support and the training of judiciary and judicial
staff.186 In addition, the Parliament argued that Article 87 TFEU should be a relevant
legal basis due to the police cooperation activities set up by the Agreement falling
under the task carried out by police forces. 187 Finally, in light of assistance and the
development cooperation goal of the EU and the Republic of Mauritius, the Parliament
claimed that the ordinary legislative procedure should be applied under Article 218, 6
(a) (v) TFEU requiring the consent of the Parliament.188
In contrast, the Council, supported by a number of intervening member States,
argued that the scope of the Agreement was mainly to strengthen international security
in the framework of CFSP and that the actions undertaken by the "Atalanta constitute
police" cannot therefore be considered judicial cooperation within the meaning of
Title V falling within the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). 189 In countering
the Parliament's argument that the aim and the content of the Agreement did not fall

Parliament v. Council, Case C-658/11, EU:C:2014:2025.
Parliament v. Council, Case C-263/14, EU:C:2016:435.
184 Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025.
5 Id. ¶ 24.
186 Id. ¶ 26 (citing article 7(3) of the EU-Mauritius agreement).
18 Id. ¶ 26.
188 Id. ¶ 29.
89
1 Id. ¶ 31-32.
182
183
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under AFSJ or development cooperation, the Council also reinstated that "the
promotion of human rights in third countries is an objective that falls within CFSP." 190
The Opinion of Advocate General Bot followed the argument made by the
Council and some of the intervening Member States. He argued that the Agreement
fell primarily under CFSP and is "therefore of little importance, contrary to the claims
made by the Parliament, that the agreement in question also relates, in a secondary
manner, to fields other than CFSP [...]."191 The AG predicted that many Agreements
concluded under CFSP due to the "well-recognized interrelationship between security,
development, and human rights" would have some relationship with some Union
policies and thus, require the consent of the Parliament at large.192 According to the
AG, whether AFSJ has a purely internal objective or an external dimension, "must be
taken with the aim to further freedom, security and justice inside the Union." 193 Even
though the AG could not explain when AFSJ had an internal or external dimension,
he reassured that even an Agreement about the training of prosecutors "to ensure the
protection of human rights and the consolidation of rule of law" are among the
objectives of CFSP. 194
In a rather succinct judgment by the Grand Chamber under President Skouris, the
Court annulled the Council decision for a procedural reason. Initially, the Court
rejected the EP's argument that CFSP is not the exclusive legal basis due to other
incidental goals that are beyond the main aim of the Agreement.1 95 However, in
departing from the Opinion of AG Bot, who argued against the annulment, 196 the Court
found that the Council infringed the procedural requirement of Article 218(10) TFEU
whereby the Parliament ought to be timely informed by the Council about the
Conclusion of the Agreement. The Court restated that the procedural requirement is
essential to allow the Parliament to exercise fully its right of "democratic scrutiny on
the European Union external action." 197 In citing its well-known jurisprudence on the
democratic principles in Roquette Freres, the CJEU asserted its authority of judicial
review in foreign relations in respect of the democratic principle of political
representation of the European Parliament and its meaningful consultation in the
making of CFSP. 198
3.

Expanding Judicial Review in Common Foreign Security Policy

In a subsequent case, the EP brought an annulment action before the CJEU
challenging Decision 2014/198/ CFSP on the conclusion of the agreement between
the EU and Tanzania. This agreement defined the conditions of transfer of suspected
pirates and associated seized property from the EU-led naval force to the United
Republic of Tanzania. 199 In this ruling, the CJEU once again relied on the relevance

19 Id.¶33.
191
192
193

1

9 4

Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Parliament v. Council, Case C-658/11, EU: C:2014:41, ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶
Id. ¶

109.
119.

Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, ¶¶ 46-50.
196 Op. Advoc. Gen., Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:41, ¶ 154.
197 Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, ¶ 79.
19 Id. ¶ 81.
199 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Parliament v. Council, Case C263/14, EU: C:2015:729.
195
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of international law and in particular the U.N. Security Council resolutions inviting all
States to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia and supported the custody and
prosecution of the pirates by local officers.2 00
The European Parliament brought this action against the Council, with the support
of the Commission, to annul the decision while maintaining its effects until its
replacement. The EP started from the premise that Article 37 TFEU was not the
exclusive legal basis of the decision that did not fall only within the CFSP competence.
The EP alleged instead that since Articles 82 and 83 TFEU were additional legal bases
from the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) these required under TFEU
218(6) the consent of the EP in international agreements. 201 In the EU-Tanzania
agreement, the EP was not only ensuring peace and international security but also
facilitating:
[...]cooperation between the authorities of those Member States and
those of the United Republic of Tanzania by establishing a legal
framework for the surrender of suspects to that third State in order
that it can take responsibility for investigations and prosecutions.
Further, that agreement contains provisions directly relating to
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation and,
in particular, on the treatment, prosecution and trial of persons
transferred.2 02
Based on this type of action the Parliament argued that the EU-Tanzania
Agreement was "closely linked" to Title V of the TFEU Treaty on AFSJ because the
persons arrested and detained, suspected of acts of piracy, and property seized, are
subject to the jurisdictions of the Member States participating in the EU NAVFOR.2 03
In addition, the Parliament suggested that in the previous EU-Mauritius Agreement,
the CJEU did not clarify whether CFSP was the only center of gravity, as AG Bot calls
it, of the directive with Article 37 TEU, or whether it should have been based on other
4
Treaty provisions.2 0
On the other hand, the
including the Czech Republic,
action was unfounded because
Article 218 (5) and (6) was
Parliament.2 os

Council, supported by a number of Member States
Sweden, and UK, counterclaimed that such annulment
Article 37 TEU was the sole substantive legal basis and
the procedural legal basis excluding consent of the

Advocate General Kokott was adamant in her Opinion that, despite the precedent,
the CJEU decision on the EU-Mauritius agreement deserved "autonomous
examination." 206 In doing so, the AG opened up the possibility to seriously re-consider
the substantive claim of the parliament of a possible dual substantive legal basis "by
exercising additional competences."207 The AG recognized that the Agreement
¶ 17.
¶ 25.
¶ 28.
¶ 31; see EU NAVAL
¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 33.
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FORCE - SOMALIA, https://eunavfor.eu/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2021).

See Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2015:729.
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contains a number of provisions that are typical of cross-border judicial cooperation,
but noted that it also bears a certain "affinity with the subject matter regulated in the
AFSJ," 208 as it held that this is insufficient "to recognize Article 82 and 87 TFEU as
additional legal basis since these provide as the Council has argued for cooperation
within the Union." 209
AG Kokott stated that the cooperation between Tanzania and the Union seeks to
achieve international security outside the EU territory.210 However, there is not a
specific connection with security within the European Union and the national security
of its Member States. 211 As Kokott explained, when suspected pirates are to be
transferred by the EUNAVFOR, these are temporarily detainees and subject to the
sovereignty of the EU Member States and the protections afforded by the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights. 22 She highlighted that even though EU action falls under
CFSP competence, there must be "humane treatment of detained persons and certain
principles connected with the rule of law as basic conditions for the cooperation with
Tanzania."2 1 3
The CJEU followed the AG in her assessment of the substance of the centrality
of CFSP as the legal basis of the EU-Tanzania agreement, as well as on the existence
of an infringement of the procedural requirement of timely and fully informing the EP
under Article 218(4) TEFU. In expanding the legal standing of the CJEU and the role
of the EP in foreign relations, the legal diplomacy exercised by the Court rested on
guaranteeing democratic control beyond formal requirements but also fundamental
14
principles ensuring citizens' participation in EU policies.
The Court annulled the decision based on the fact that the EP was not immediately
and fully informed at all stages of the procedure leading to the signing of the
Agreement and thus prevented from exercising its right of democratic scrutiny in
CFSP. 1 5 The Court held that the information requirement of the Parliament was not
only a fundamental democratic principle, but that it allowed the EP to exercise
democratic control over the EU's external action. In justifying its expansion of judicial
review in CFSP and limiting the power of the executive, the Courtjustified its decision
through a democratization rationale by giving full information of the Parliament, thus
ensuring coherence and consistency of EU external action.2 16

208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶ 66.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 68.

¶ 72.
¶¶ 77-78.
Id. ¶ 84. In doing so the Court cites its previous judgment aiming to show a progression from its
Id.

214 Id.
21

previous position rather than a more bold interpretation of CFSP now under the democratic scrutiny of the
parliament and increasingly scrutinized by the CJEU with respect to the application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights as indicated by Advocate General Kokott's opinion.
21 Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2015:729, ¶¶ 71-73.
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PART III. FEDERALISM IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
A.

Federalism in U.S. Foreign Relations

After World War II and during the Cold War, commentators described the U.S.
constitutional legal order as fostering a regime that was executive in terms of
separations of powers, nationalist as a matter of federalism, and internationalist in
general orientation.2 7 Formalist doctrines, in which some matters might be
categorically excluded from foreign affairs power, were replaced by balancing tests
that gave the government what seemed to be the appropriate degree of flexibility. Once
the Soviet Union collapsed, "parochial doctrines" reemerged. 218 That is, domestic
states' rights were no longer segregated but were part of the constitutional doctrine.
Traditional international law involved the direct creation of binding rules in bilateral
or multilateral treaties, while modern international law established free-standing lawmaking institutions to generate norms.21 9 One doctrine that was associated with the
New Deal-Great Society Order was a strong presumption that the national power over
foreign affairs preempted state legislation, even when Congress had not in fact directly
exercised its power and even when the state legislation was not obviously
22 0
incompatible with what Congress had actually done.
1.

Treaty Enforcement as Self-Executing Power

By altering the British Rule for which international treaties did not have the force
of ordinary law, the Framers of the Constitution adopted the Supremacy Clause, which
declared treaties to be the "supreme law of the land" and directed the courts to give
them effect without awaiting action by the legislatures of either the states or the federal
Government.2 2 1 This effectuated a wholesale incorporation of U.S. treaties into
domestic law by Congress. The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to avoid
violations of treaties attributable to the United States by making treaties enforceable
in the courts for individuals relying on the Treaty without the need for additional
222
legislative action.
An early example of such enforcement arose in U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, where
the U.S. and France signed a treaty that provided for the restoration of ships captured
during the two states' undeclared naval conflict.2 2 3 Because the terms of the treaty
altered the legal status of the vessel at issue after the claims had already been brought
217 Mark V. Tushnet, Federalism and InternationalHuman Rights in the New ConstitutionalOrder,

47 WAYNE L. REV. 841, 844 (2001).
2 18
Id.
219

0

Id.

2 Id.
221 U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing

Treaties, 89 AM. I. INT'L L. 695, 698 (1995) ("the Framers considered two alternative mechanisms: the
Virginia plan would have given Congress the power to 'negate' state laws that contravened the Constitution,
federal statutes or treaties. As applied to treaties, this plan would apparently have retained the need for an
act of the legislature transforming each treaty obligation into domestic law (although it would have
empowered the federal legislature to act in place of the state legislatures). The New Jersey plan, on the other
hand, included a version of the Supremacy Clause, which declared the Constitution, federal laws and treaties
to have automatic domestic legal force and instructed the courts to give them effect directly").
222 See Vazquez, supra note 223, at 698-99.
22 3
U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 107 (1801).
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before the lower courts, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the treaty had
legal effect.22 4 Despite the lack of any domestic legislation accompanying the treaty,
the court held that the treaty did govern the legal status of the vessel.22 s
2. Creating the distinction between Self-Executing and Non-Self Executing
Treaties
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties first
emerged in Fosterv. Nielson, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that some
treaties require legislative implementation before they may be enforced by the
courts.22 6 The Court in Foster recognized that non-self-executing treaties do not
themselves purport to affect the rights and individuals before the court, but instead
those particular rights and liabilities will be affected by future acts of domestic
lawmaking.2 2 7
A self-executing treaty is a treaty that may be enforced in the courts without prior
legislation by Congress; non-self-executing treaties, by contrast, are those treaties that
do not align with domestic law, and therefore require subsequent federal or state laws,
commonly referred to as "implementing legislation" to be enforced. 228 A recent
Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Bond,229 provides a vivid illustration of implementing
legislation and its limitations under SCOTUS review. In Bond, a woman was charged
with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of Section
229 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which gave domestic
effect to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. 230 The woman's
actions precipitating these charges consisted of spreading arsenic and other chemicals
on another woman's doorknob and mailbox in retaliation for an affair.2 31 The court, in
rejecting the Section 229 charges, held that a plain reading of the Convention and
Congress's implementing legislation evinced an intention by the drafters to address
global chemical weapons proliferation and not the limited issues in the instant case.2 32
Further, the Court limited the Convention's domestic effect under a federalism theory,
holding that the Convention and implementing legislation could not be construed so
broadly that it upset the balance between states and the federal government by
infringing on the states' traditional role in adjudicating issues of criminal law. 233
Although the court acknowledged the case was "unusual", the SCOTUS in Bond

224Id. at 108.
225
226

Id. at 109-10.
27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Duncan B. Hollis & Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty Self-Execution as

"Foreign" Foreign Relations Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW 468 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).
227 See Vazquez, supra note 223, at 700-4.
228 Id. (explaining that self-executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to
U.S.
state law, and inferior to the Constitution. Self-executing executive agreements have a status that is superior
to U.S. state law and inferior to the Constitution.).
229 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
2 30
Id. at 848-53.
23
232
233

Id. at 852.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 862-66.
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nonetheless found multiple grounds on which to limit the domestic legal effect of an
international convention and its implementing legislation.
3.

Medellin and its legacy on Human Rights Treaties

Although the Supreme Court in Bond cemented its role as arbiter of the scope of
treaties' domestic legal effect, the indications of this power were revealed in the
Medellin case decided several years earlier. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Medellin case to determine whether the President had the authority to implement
the Avena decision into federal law, preempting criminal procedural rules. 234 InAvena,
the International Court of Justice found that the United States breached its Vienna
Convention treaty obligations. As a result, the ICJ ordered the United States to "review
and reconsider" the cases that Mexico had identified.2 3s Review and reconsider
"guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna
Convention." 236 The Medellin Court held that, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,
Avena was not automatically enforceable domestic federal law-the Court not only
rejected the defendant's argument that the treaties obligating the United States to abide
by the decisions of the ICJ are self-executing, but also rejected the defendant's
subsequent argument that any ICJ judgment issued according to those treaties must
also be self-executing. 237 SCOTUS further held that the Avena decision in the ICJ and
the president's memorandum did not preempt petitioners from filing habeas petitions
because ICJ opinions are not automatically enforceable on state courts.238 Ultimately,
the Medellin case and the cases that rely on this precedent show how the U.S.
government's objections and non-party status to the ICJ's international law
jurisdiction result in an unenforceable claim in domestic U.S. state courts.23 9
Additionally, as comparative law scholars have pointed out, the approach of Medellin
resonates with the one of the CJEU in Kadi in which both courts highlighted the
'separateness' of international law from the domestic constitutional order.240
Medellin centers on the requirements of Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Rights. Article 36(1) has been the source of increasing tension between

23 4

See generallyMedellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). The defendant was convicted of murder in
Texas. He appealed on violation of habeas corpus claiming that he was not made aware of his right to access
the Mexican consulate as required by Article 36 of the VCCL. The state of Mexico brought cases to the ICJ
claiming that the U.S. violated article 36. Mexico did not bring the claim directly under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, (VCCR) because of the ruling in Breard which established domestic
law that trumps the VCCR. The court relies on its ruling in Avena instead, where the court found that the
U.S. was in violation under the VCCR.
235 Taryn Marks, The Problems ofSelf-Execution, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 191 (2009).
236

Id.

237 See generallyMedellin, 552

U.S. 491.
The U.S. Constitution does not require state courts to honor a treaty obligation of the United States
by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice. The Vienna Convention states that if a person
detained by a foreign country asks, the authorities of the detaining national must delay, inform the consular
post of the detainee of the detention. The decision in the Avena case constitutes an international law
obligation on the part of the United States but does not help the defendant in Medellin because not all
international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law.
239 Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration ofInternational
Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 758-9 (2006).
24° GrAinne de Btrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi,
51 HARV. INT'L L. 1 1, 43, 49 (2010).
238
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the United States and the ICJ, particularly because the Supreme Court and the ICJ
have reached irreconcilable conclusions about the Article's meaning and its domestic
implications. 241 Under Medellin there is a perception that treaties regulating police
powers, which are reserved to the states, will most likely be non-self-executing under
the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.2 4 2 The legacy of
Medellin could also eliminate the possibility of courts considering the treaty
implementation efforts of other branches. Previously, states and localities had the
obligation and mandate to implement ratified treaties, but this space for sub-national
innovation disappears if these instruments have no meaning in domestic law absent
federal legislation.24 3
However, there is a small but significant group of opinions in which state courts
use international human rights treaties in the informative but non-binding way that
most scholars have envisioned.2 44 The most prominent are those decided by state
appellate and high courts on controversial or challenging issues of state constitutional
interpretation.2 4 S These include the California Supreme Court's decision on same-sex
marriage which cited to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Missouri Supreme Court's reliance on the Convention of the Rights of
the Child (CRC) to strike down the juvenile death penalty, and the Oregon Supreme
Court's references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
ICCPR, and the European Convention to interpret a state constitutional provision
governing the treatment of the incarcerated.2 4 6
The Supreme Court has been receptive to such approaches on foreign and
international norms when analyzing standards under the Eighth Amendment. The most
common scenario in which claims based on the ratified international human treaties
are introduced in state courts is in challenges to the practice of capital punishment and
life without parole.2 4 7 The majority of human rights law in Supreme Court opinions
striking down some applications of the death penalty has likely led advocates to raise
treaty-based claims in more cases, if only for preservation in the event of future
changes in the law, but most of the successful treaty-based arguments were not based
on their use as binding authority.2 4 8

241 Marks, supranote 237.
242 Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The InternationalProspects of State
ConstitutionalismAfter Medellin, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2011). As a formal matter, not all

human rights treaties have equal status in United States law. There are some treaties that the United States
has signed, but that have not been adopted by the Senate. Then there are instruments that the United States
has signed and ratified, but that have not been implemented through federal legislation. Finally, there are
treaties that have been signed, ratified, and implemented through federal legislation.
243

Id. at 1070.

244

Id. at 1059.

24s Id.
2*e

24 7

24 8

Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1069.
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The Mixed Agreements Jurisprudenceof the CJEU

The functional comparison with the non-self-execution of treaties in the United
States lies in what the EU calls "mixed agreement."2 4 9 When these treaties include
issues that are of shared competence between the European Community and its
Member States, there needs to be a joint ratification of the agreement to make it valid
under European law. This concept was first established by the European Court of
Justice in Opinion 1/94.
1.

The Judicial Creation of Mixity in International Agreements

In Opinion 1/94, the Court gave its opinion on the powers of the European
Community (EC) to conclude and ratify the MarrakeshAgreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") and its annexes: the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 250 Because the EC gradually
enlarged its Member States who were also a party to the GATT 1947, the Commission
purported that the WTO Agreement fell within the Community's exclusive external
competence. Instead the Council took the view that no such competence existed in
respect of the GATS and the TRIPS and that the competence to conclude the WTO
Agreement was shared by the Community and its Member States.25 s
The Court indicated that the fundamental question was not if the Community has
the competence to conclude the WTO Agreement in its entirety, but if such
competence was exclusive as laid out by the Common Commercial Policy under
Article 113 EC Treaty. 25 2 The ECJ stated that there was a common understanding that
this provision concerned tariffs and trade agreements, and therefore such agreements
fell exclusively within the Community's competence.25 3 Concerning the GATS and
the TRIPS, the Court distinguished between the "cross-border supply" and the three
other modes of service supply provided for in the GATS (consumption abroad,
commercial presence via a subsidiary or branch, and the presence of natural persons

249 See Marise Cremona, Making Treatiesand OtherInternationalAgreements:The European Union,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 239 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2019).

Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384.
In accordance with article 228 (6) EC Treaty (the ancestor of 218 (11) TFEU), the MS sought an
opinion from the Court of Justice, asking the following questions: "(i) Does the European Community have
the competence to conclude all parts of the Agreement establishing the WTO concerning trade in Services
(GATS) and the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in counterfeit goods
(TRIPS) on the basis of the EC Treaty, more particularly on the basis of Article 113 EC alone, or in
combination with Article 100a EC and/or Article 235 EC? (ii) Does the European Community have the
competence to conclude alone also those parts of the WTO Agreement which concern products and/or
services falling exclusively within the scope of application of the ECSC [European Coal and Steel
Community] and EAEC [European Atomic Energy Community] Treaties? (iii) If the answer to the above
two questions is in the affirmative, does this affect the ability of the Member States to conclude the WTO
Agreement, in the light of the agreement already reached that they will be original Members of the WTO?".
252 TFEU, supra note 14, art. 207 ("(1) The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform
principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such
as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.").
253 Since Article 207 of TFEU (ex Article 133 of the EC Treaty) also covers EURATOM products (¶
24) and ESCC products (¶ 27), it concluded that the EC had the exclusive competence to conclude the WTO
Agreement (¶1 34).
250
251
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enabling a supplier from one member country to supply services within the territory
of another).254 It concluded that only the cross-frontier supply of services fell within
the concept of the Common Commercial Policy.25 5 The conclusion regarding the
TRIPS is that it fell outside the scope of the EC competence under the Common
Commercial Policy, except when concerned with the laying down of provisions aimed
at prohibiting the release into free circulation of counterfeit goods.2 s6
The Commission also contended that the EC enjoyed exclusive external
competence to conclude the GATS and the TRIPS on the basis of the doctrine of
implied powers base on the ERTA judgement. 257 The Court rejected this contention.
Rather, it held that the EC's exclusive external competence did not automatically flow
from its power to lay down rules at an internal level because Member States only lost
their right to assume obligations with non-member countries when common EC rules
came into being. Since the GATS and the TRIPS were only partially covered by such
common rules, the EC could not be regarded as having an exclusive competence for
their conclusion.2 ss
The final concern raised by the Commission was whether the EC and its Member
States should be regarded as sharing competence in respect of the GATS and the
TRIPS, which would undermine the EC's unity of action vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
The Court pointed out that when the subject matter of an international agreement falls
in part within the competence of the EC and in part within that of the Member States,
the Community institutions and the Member States are under an obligation to cooperate both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the
commitments entered into. 25 9 This collaborative approach highlights the same tension
inherent in U.S. conceptions of federalism, in that some legal areas affecting the entire
EC are to be addressed by European institutions while appropriate roles for Member
States must be preserved.
2.

Expanding the EU Competence and Mixity in Opinion 2/15

In 2009, the Council authorized the Commission to negotiate a bilateral trade
agreement with the Republic of Singapore ("EUSFTA"). In 2011, the Commission
asked the Council to modify the negotiating directives so as to include investment
protection. 260 The Council decided to supplement the negotiating directives to that
effect. In 2015, the Commission informed the Trade Policy Committee of the Council
that the negotiations ended and that an agreement has been reached, with a chapter

¶ 36.
Id. ¶¶ 44-47.
256
Id. ¶55.
257 The Commission cited three possible sources for such exclusive competence: First, it was argued
that exclusive competence to conclude GATS and TRIPS flows implicitly from the provisions of the EC
Treaty establishing the EC's internal competence or, in any event, from the existence of legislative acts
giving effect to that competence (following the ERTA
case, Case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities v Council [1971]).
258 Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384, ¶¶ 77, 95-97, 102, 103.
25 9
Id. ¶¶ 108, 109.
254 Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384,
255
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EUROPARL,

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative -train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-toharness-globalisation/file-eu-singapore-fta (last updated Nov. 20, 2019).
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concerning investment and investment dispute settlement.2 61 Because of the
differences of opinion between the Committee and the Commission on the nature of
the European Union's competence to conclude the envisaged agreement, the
Commission requested an opinion to the CJEU.2 62
In Opinion 1/17 on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and
the Republic of Singapore, the CJEU held that the Union had exclusive competence
only with respect to direct investment. Referring to Article 207,263 the Court found
that the EU could not be granted the exclusive external competence to conclude
agreements relating to indirect investment. It also held that an EU external competence
for indirect investment could not be inferred from the necessity to fulfill an internal
objective (according to Article 3(2) TFEU).2 64
However, the CJEU clarified that the exercise of some of the Union's external
competence is justified by Article 216 TFEU because of the need to achieve certain
goals set out in the treaties.2 6 s The Court affirmed that this provision, in conjunction
with Article 63 TFEU, prohibited all barriers to the free circulation of capital and
payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries.2 66
This provision covers both direct and indirect investment and is the only EU
fundamental freedom aiming to produce its effects also outside the EU Single
Market. 267 But since TFEU provisions cannot bind non-EU Members, the external
liberalization of capital movements requires the conclusion of international
agreements with third countries, such as the EU-Singapore Trade Agreement.2 68
Concerning the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, the CJEU
observed that the trade agreement conferred on Singaporean investors the power to
bring a claim not only against the EU but also against its Member States. As such, it

261

Id.

The request of the Commission was worded as follows: "Does the Union have the requisite
competence to sign and conclude alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More specifically, 1.
which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union's exclusive competence? 2. which provisions of
the agreement fall within the Union's shared competence? And 3. is there any provision of the agreement
that falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States?".
263 Ex-article 113 EC Treaty on the Common Commercial Policy.
264 TFEU, supranote 14, art. 3(2) ("The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion
of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope.").
265 Id. art. 216 ("The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or
international organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred
to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or
alter their scope.").
2
e Id. art. 63 ("1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be
prohibited.
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on payments between
Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.").
262

267 Francesco Montanaro & Sophia Paulini, United in Mixity? The Future of the EU Common
CommercialPolicy in light of the CJEU'srecent case law, in EJIL: TALK! BLOG EUR. I. INT'L L. (Feb. 2,

2018),
https://www.eiiltalk.or/united-in-mixity-the-future-of-the-eu-common-commercial-policy-inlight-of-the-ci eus-recent-case-law/.
zes Id.
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removes the disputes away from the jurisdiction of the Member States, and
consequently the Union and the Member States must enjoy shared competence with
respect to the establishment of the ISDS mechanism. In conclusion, because of the
shared nature of the competence over this matter, the CJEU held that the EUSingapore trade agreement could not be concluded by the Union alone but was a mixed
agreement for which the Member States and the Union had to work together. 269 The
Court found that the EU had exclusive competence over most of the EUSFTA but
shared competence over non-direct investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement.
Despite the fact that the EU thus enjoyed competence to conclude the free trade
agreement when addressing sustainable development matters, the Court held that the
agreement required the involvement of the Member States. 270
After the opinion, the Trade Commissioner at the time, Cecilia Malmstrdm,
stated:
"About the ECJ opinion on the Singapore trade agreement: This
gives us very welcome and much-needed clarity about how to
negotiate and interpret EU Treaties. The Opinion should put us on
solid footing for the future. I look forward to working with
governments [and] European Parliament to define a way
forward." 271
The European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement with Singapore in
February 2019, and that was deemed "a stepping stone to trade agreements with other
countries in the region."2 72
C.

From InternationalInvestment Law to the Autonomy of EU Law

A few weeks after a central case for the European rule of law and the protection
of judicial independence of domestic courts, Juizes Portugueses,273 in March 2018,
the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV.
The relation between the two cases is not immediately obvious due to their subject
matter, but they are connected by the notion of "effective legal protection", or the
idea thatArticle 19(1) affects alljudicialproceedings before nationalcourts.27 4
1.

Achmea from a Rule of Law Perspective

InAchmea, the Court held for the first time that an investor-state arbitration clause
in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between two EU states was incompatible with

2 69

Id.

Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992, ¶¶ 244, 292.
Cecilia Malmstrdm (@MalmstromEU), TWITTER (May 16, 2017, 6:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/MalmstromEU/status/864427142930735 104.
272 European Parliament Press Release, Parliamentgives green light to EU-Singapore trade and
270
271

investment

protection

deals

(Feb.

13,

2019),

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-

room/20190207IPR25207/ep-gives-green-light-to-eu-singapore-trade-and-investment-protection-deals.
273 See Associagao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117 (establishing that a national court

or tribunal can rely on EU law, through article 19 TEU and consequently article 47 of the Charter of
fundamental law to protect its independence).
27 4
Id. ¶ 29.
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EU law. 275 In the aftermath of Opinion 2/15 on the Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, 276 this case followed the Commission path to reform intra-BITs within the
EU.2 77 Many Eastern and Central European countries concluded about 196 intra-EU
BITs with EU Member States after the fall of the Berlin Wall and before their
accession to the EU in 2014, creating a sizeable flow of investments from Western to
Eastern Europe. 278
The Achmea dispute originated in Slovakia's reversal of its reformed, liberalized
healthcare system. 279 In 2004, Slovakia opened its market for private medical
insurance services. 280 As a result, Dutch insurance company Achmea established a
subsidiary in Slovakia, and began selling insurance services there under the terms of
a bilateral investment treaty that Netherlands and Slovakia signed in 1991.281 In 2006,
however, Slovakia partially reversed its 2004 reforms and prohibited distributing
profits generated by the insurance sales to shareholders, preventing Achmea from
operating in Slovakia. 282 This prohibition was ruled as contrary to the Slovak
Constitution in 2011 by Slovakia's Constitutional Court, so the distribution of profits
was once again allowed by private insurers. 283 However, Achmea had already initiated
an UNCITRAL arbitration against Slovakia under the terms of Article 8 of the
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.284 The defendant, Slovakia, objected to the UNCITRAL
tribunal's jurisdiction by arguing that the BIT in question was incompatible with EU
law and was invalid because Slovakia had joined the EU in 2004.285
During the UNCITRAL arbitration, the European Commission intervened to
support Slovakia's claim that the arbitral tribunal was improper under EU law.286 By

275 SlovakRepublic, Case C-284/16, EU:C2018:158; Liz Tout & Lionel Nichols, EuropeanInvestors
Reconsider Their Position Following the ECJ's Decision in Achmea, DENTONS (June 18, 2018),

https://www.mondaq.com/uk/international-trade-investment/711672/european-investors-reconsider-theirposition-following-the-ecj 3 9s-decision-in-achmea.
276 Sebastian Lukic & Anne-Karin Grill, Towards a Post-Arbitration Age: The European
Commission 'sFast-TrackReformofInvestment Dispute Settlement, KLUWER ARB. BLOG 1 (Dec. 11, 2017);

see generally Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992.
277 Daniele Gallo & Fernanda G. Nicola, The External Dimension of EU Investment Law:
JurisdictionalClashes and Transformative Adjudication, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1081 (2016).
278 Fernanda G. Nicola, Another View of the Cathedral: What Does the Rule of Law Crisis Tell Us
About Democratizingthe EU?, 25 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L., 133 (2018).
279 John I. Blanck, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BK The Death Knell for Intra-EUBITs?, AM. SOC'Y

INT'L L., https://asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/8/slovak-republic-v-achmea-bv-death-knell-inra-eu-bits
(Jun. 19, 2018).
28o Id.
281

After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia succeeded to Czechoslovakia's rights

and obligations under the original BIT. Szilard Gaspar-Szilagyi, It is not Just About Investor-State
Arbitration:A Look at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV, 3 EuR. PAPERS, 357 (2018); see generally Court Press

Release No. 26/18, Judgment in Case C-286/16 Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV (Mar. 6, 2018).
282 Nichols & Tout, supra note 277; see also Gaspar-Szilagyi, supra note 283; Blanck supra note 281;
see generally Tom Jones, Germany's Top Court Shows Obedience to Achmea, Global Arb. Rev.,
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/ 1176731/germanyE2%80%99s-top-court-shows-obedienceto-achmea (Nov. 9, 2018).
283 Blanck, supra note 281.
284 Joerg Risse & Max Oehm, The Aftermath ofAchmea: Germany Requests Dismissalof Vattenfall

Case after CJEU's Achmea Decision, GLOBAL ARB. REV., https://globalarbitrationnews.com/aftermath-

achmea-germany-requests-dismissal-vattenfall-case-cjeus-achmea-decision/ (May 14, 2018).
285 Blanck, supranote 281.
286 Nichols & Tout, supra note 277.
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2010, the UNCITRAL tribunal set aside Slovakia's jurisdictional arguments and the
case proceeded to a final award on the merits. In 2012, the UNCITRAL tribunal
rendered its final award ordering Slovakia to pay 22.1 million euros plus interest in
damages to the Achmea group for breaching the BIT's fair and equitable treatment
standard. 287
As Frankfurt was the seat of arbitration, Slovakia challenged the arbitral award in
the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt in 2014, arguing again that the arbitral award
violated "several provisions of EU law, in particular regarding the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)" because "the tribunal had lacked
jurisdiction due to Article 8's incompatibility with EU law," but its action was
dismissed. 288
In 2016, the Bundesgerichtshofheld that "there was no incompatibility between
EU law and the BIT," but referred the issue of the co-existence between an arbitral
jurisdiction and EU Law to the Court of Justice under a preliminary reference
procedure. 289 According to the TFEU a question of interpretation before a "court or
tribunal of an EU member state," such as the Bundesgerichtshofin Achmea, can be
referred to the CJEU.
The Achmea Court diverged from the AG Wathelet opinion that concluded that
intra-EU BITs were not in breach of EU law. The arbitral tribunal created in the BIT
was according to the AG "a court or tribunal of a Member State" as defined by Article
267 TFEU, and thus could request the CJEU to issue preliminary rulings on questions
of EU law if necessary." 290 Instead, the CJEU held that the arbitration treaty inAchmea
was incompatible with EU law. The CJEU began its analysis by noting EU law had
"primacy" over the law of the Member States and that an international agreement,
such as the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, "could not affect the allocations of EU powers
as set by the Treaty on European Union (TEU)." 291 In this sense the Court showed that
the arbitral tribunal was adjudicating on matters related to EU law rather than
international law.
The CJEU then analyzed Articles 267 and 344 together under the principle of
autonomy of EU law, as interpreted in its Opinion 2/13 to be one of the essential
characteristics of the EU legal order. The CJEU held that an investment tribunal, in
fulfilling its mandate under a BIT, could be required to interpret or apply EU law, was
not an integral part of the judicial system of either the Netherlands or Slovakia and, as
such, was not a "court" that could refer questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
Furthermore, the CJEU held that "the awards of such a tribunal [were] not subject to

28 7

Id.

Risse & Oehm, supra note 286; see Gaspar-Szilagyi, supra note 276; see also Nichols & Tout,
supra note 277.
288

289 Article 267 TFEU authorizes but does not require the court or tribunal to request a ruling on
the
interpretive question from the CJEU in the form of a preliminary reference.

290 Clement Fouchard & Mark Krestin, The Judgment of the CJEU in Slovak Republic v. Achmea -A
Loud Clap of Thunder on the Intra-EUBIT Sky!, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 7 2018).
291 Blanck, supra note 281.
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review by Member State courts to an extent that would allow them to refer a question
to the CJEU on issues of EU law raised before the arbitral tribunal." 292
Finally, the CJEU held that the arbitral tribunal's award according to the Court
was not subject to review by an EU Member State court, which is required by TEU
Article 19, due to the "finality and one-sidedness" of investor-state arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court found that the arbitral tribunal undermines the primacy of EU
law because the arbitration clause in the BIT overall "removes disputes involving the
interpretation or application of EU law from the mechanism of judicial review
provided for by the EU legal framework." 293 Therefore, the arbitral tribunal was
outside the EU judicial system and thus was an attempt to avoid the jurisdiction of the
Dutch or Slovak courts.
The violation of EU law by the arbitration clause was related to the fact that the
Member States agreed to remove from the jurisdiction of their courts and bestow on
the CJEU the sole power to apply and interpret EU law. 294 However even more
important for the application of the rule of law, Achmea should be understood as a
clear commitment by the CJEU to strengthen the judicial protections and the mutual
trust among judiciaries as preserved by Article 2 of the TEU. This provision, together
with Article 19 TEU have become for the Court a central pillar to protect the
independence of the national judiciary2 9s ensuring that citizens have access to a fair
trial and effective judicial remedies at the national and supranational level.
The chart below summarizes the functional comparison between the role, the
processes, and the legal doctrines developed both in the SCOTUS and the CJEU that
have limited or enhanced the judicialization of foreign policy across very different
historical periods with respect to judicial federalism.
Table 2. Comparing Legal Diplomacy: Federalism in the SCOTUS and CJEU

DOCTRINE:

Non-Judicial Involvement in
Foreign Relations

Judicialization of Foreign
Relations

(R)

(L)

US Commerce Clause

US Police Powers

EU Common CommercialPolicy

EU Lack of Competence

US Self-Executing Treaties

US Non Self-Executing
Treaties

Federalism
(Part III)

EU Exclusive Competence

EU Mixed Agreements

292 GAspAr-SzilAgyi, supra note 276, at 2; see generally
Slovak Republic, Case C-284/16,
EU:C2018:158, ¶¶ 50-52.
293 Fouchard & Krestin, supra note 292.
294 See SlovakRepublic, Case C-284/16, EU:C2018:158, ¶ 55.

295 See Associagao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses,EU:C:2018:117,

¶

30.
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PART IV. POLITICIZATION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF
AUTHORITARIANISM
Judicial independence has become a pillar of democratic constitutional regimes
especially in a time when courts have been perceived as tools of last resort to save
democratic institutions from authoritarian leaders. 296 A well-established literature
addresses how courts can protect liberal constitutionalism by working on the "edges"
of democracy and preventing democratic backsliding.297 By the same token, some
scholars have noticed how autocratic leaders' practice of "abusive judicial review" 298
transformed constitutional courts around the world into powerful weapons in their
regimes. In some European Union countries, such as Hungary and Poland,
authoritarian regimes seek to use domestic courts to strengthen executive powers by
changing the liberal constitutional structures,299 often with the consent of courts that
have been packed or curbed by authoritarians.3oo In this new transitional scenario, the
abstract doctrine of judicial independence became more politicized as a tool of
republican resistance against authoritarianism.301
The enlisting of domestic courts as a tool of 'abusive constitutionalism' 302 is not
only a Central and Eastern European phenomenon. It is now at the core of the struggle
undertaken by the EU against the authoritarian regimes of Hungary and Poland. This
approach shows that the CJEU has engaged gradually and by crafting formal legal
doctrines to entrench the notion of judicial independence and effective judicial
remedies from its foreign relations jurisprudence into its internal constitutional
doctrine that applies uniformly to all 27 Member States.
The legal diplomacy of the CJEU differs from the political path that the
Commission and the EP have undertaken to fight the autocrats through the Article 7.2
TEU procedure. This procedure received worldwide attention, but only shames these
governments that have overtly breached basic rule of law guarantees of their citizens,
as the legal diplomacy of the CJEU vis-6-vis the Hungarian and Polish judicial
independence has been easily circumvented by ruling parties. However, in the long
term, the legal diplomacy of the CJEU performed three distinct functions. First, in
entrenching its rule of law doctrines in its foreign relations and internal jurisprudence
alike, the CJEU enriched its conceptual apparatus and legal toolkit by expanding the
scope of its judicial balancing and deference. Second, the CJEU created new evidence
296 See TOM GINSBURG & Aziz Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-5 (2018);
STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 1 (2018).
297 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED

POWER

IN THE

ERA

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015); Samuel Issacharoff, ConstitutionalCourtsand Democratic Hedging, 99
GEO. L. J. 961, 1002 (2011).
298 See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive JudicialReview: Courts againstDemocracy, UC

DAVIS L. REV. 1313 (2020).
299 Kim Lane Scheppele, UnderstandingHungary's ConstitutionalRevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY

AND ROMANIA 111 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pal Sonnevend, eds. 2015).
soo Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 560-62 (2018); Ozan O. Varol,
Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1676-77 (2015).
301 See Duncan Kennedy, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Liberal Democracies, in
AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 161, 181 (Helena Alviar

Garcia & Gunter Frankenberg, eds. 2019).
302 David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013).
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for other EU institutions seeking to create financial penalties against the authoritarians
by clarifying why judicial independence is at the core of republican democracies inside
the Union.303 Lastly, the legal diplomacy of the CJEU positioned the Court as the
ultimate defender of liberal and republican values against authoritarians, in a way that
opens up its jurisprudence to the hermeneutics of suspicion from either conservatives
or progressive critics because of the democratic deficit. 304
A.

ConstitutionalBacksliding as a Global Phenomenon

Several think tanks measuring and tracking the quality of democracy in countries
around the world found that the number of "highly defective democracies" doubled
between 2006 and 2010.305 From South America to Southeast Asia to Central Europe,
support for liberal democratic values is in decline. 306 The literature examining the
phenomenon of global democratic decline is ever-growing and there appears no
shortage of case studies to examine. 307
In his book on authoritarianism, Gunter Frankenberg analyses the development
and rejection, the odium and fascination with autocratic leaders in constitutional
democracies by showing how:
Autocrats have seized power and hijacked constitutions.
Antidemocratic rhetoric and propagated illiberalism reap
considerable electoral benefits even in societies that should know
better, from the experience of their own submission and liberation,
and that seemed to be well on their way to sustainable
democratization, like Hungary and Poland.30 s
In their analysis of faltering democracies, Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg
distinguished between two threats to constitutional liberal democracy: "authoritarian
reversion" or "constitutional regression." 30 9 First, authoritarian reversion is
characterized by a complete and rapid transition to authoritarianism, with examples
including Thailand, Mali, Mauritania, and Chile.310 Interestingly, the occurrence of
classic coups has generally declined in recent years. 311 The authors argue that there
has been an increase in utilization of constitutional tools to dismantle democratic

303 See Parliament Draft Report 2020/2072(INL), On the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on
Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Fundamental Rights.
3o

Duncan Kennedy, Proportionalityand 'Deference'in Contemporary ConstitutionalThought, in

THE TRANSFORMATION OR RECONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVE ON

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 29, 35 (Tamara Perisin & Sinisa Rodin eds., 2018).
3o See Transformation Index BTI 2016, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG (last visited Mar. 15, 2020),

http://perma.cc/TNT9-RHJS.
3o Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise ofLiberal Constitutionalism,

85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 243 (2018). See Landau, supranote 304, at 200-07 (2013) (discussing similarities
between democratic decline in Latin America and Southeast Asia).
307 See, e.g., Symposium: The Limits of Constitutionalism - A Global Perspective, 85 U. CH. L. REV.
239 (2018).
3 08

GUNTER FRANKENBERG, AUTHORITARIANISM: CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES xii (2020).
309 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 92-

94 (2018).
3

o Id. at 93.

311 Id.
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institutions and to form "competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes."312
Consequently, there is a need for a new classification of anti-democratic change which
Huq and Ginsburg term "constitutional regression." 313 Second, constitutional
retrogression is the process of degradation of three pillars of democracy: competitive
elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the rule of law. 314
"Backsliding," 31s "de-democratization," 316 and "autocratic legalism" 317 all describe
some form of political system caught between democracy and autocracy. 318 Evaluating
a particular political situation requires a system-wide approach because retrogression
involves many, sometimes minor changes, which standing alone show no cause for
concern. 319 Taken together, however, these changes signify a substantial shift which
warrants the reclassification of an entire political system. 32 0
Finally, Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg hypothesize that courts generally
only possess a limited ability to protect constitutional rights. 32 1 The authors show
statistical evidence that the mere existence of independent courts does not necessarily
lead to an increased likelihood that a government will respect constitutional rights. 32 2
They find that courts will at times protect themselves by "employing various
avoidance canons or deferral techniques." 32 3 Additionally, courts will protect
themselves by reaching decisions which are in line with majoritarian preferences. 32 4
However, a constitutional court's most pressing limitation likely comes from
political actors who impose retaliatory measures against a court in the form of "courtcurbing." 32 s Such measures might include jurisdiction stripping, court packing, and
other institutional changes through constitutional or statutory reform. 32 6 The case of
Poland illustrates some of these backsliding techniques in the realm of judicial
independence as well as strategies of resistance by the Polish judiciary by leveraging
supranational institutions in the EU through the CJEU and the Council of Europe
through the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.32 7

312

Id. at 94.

313 Id.
314

Id. at 96.

31s

See

How

Democratic Backsliding Happens, DEMOCRACY

DIGEST

(Feb.

21,

2017),

https://www.demdigest.org/democratic-backsliding-happens/.
316 Charles Tilly, Inequality, Democratization, and De-Democratization,21 SOC. THEORY 37, 40
(2003).
3 17
Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism 85(2) U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2018).
318 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 311, at 95.
319

Id. at 97.

320 Id.
321 See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts'LimitedAbility to Protect ConstitutionalRights,85
U. CHL L. REV. 293, 297 (2018).

322 Id. at 319 (discussing Robert Dahl's observation that "the policy views dominant on the Court are
never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities").
323 Id. at 320.
3
24

Id. at 321.
Id. at 314.

32 5

326 Id.
327 See Allyson K. Duncan & John Macy, The Collapse of JudicialIndependence in Poland: A
Cautionary Tale, 104 JUDICATURE 41 (2020).
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The Polish ConstitutionalBreakdown

Poland is a paramount example for the way in which a constitutional liberal
democracy can degrade without collapsing. Poland emerged from Communism in the
late 1980s and made an exemplary transition into free-market economics, serving as
the posterchild for Central Europe. 328 Its economy was strong, navigating the 2008
global financial crisis largely unscathed. 329 Anne Appelbaum has shown how Poland
faced the "seductive lure" of authoritarianism that was the need to find a new enemy
beyond Communism, where politics of resentment and conspiracy theories created an
alternative reality conducive to the creating of an illiberal one-party states led by
demagogues. 330 In his account of Poland after 2015, Wojciech Sadurski has shown
how the populist Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwos or PiS) party embraced
the theoretical framework of autocratic legalism 331 and used it as an instruction guide
for its constitutional reforms through statutes restricting the freedom of speech and
association and curtailing judicial independence. 332 The Polish constitutional
breakdown entailed changing the true locus of power from the government to the
ruling party 333 and from the prime minister or the President to the party leader Jaroslaw
Kaczynski. 334
The most widely used tactic by PiS are constitutional amendments by statutes
which significantly alter the Constitutional Tribunal. 335 This highlights a crucial
characteristic of PiS, which manufactures fundamental constitutional changes without
the electoral mandate to do so. 33 6 Without the super-majority required for
constitutional change, PiS proceeds by passing legislation that contravenes
constitutional provisions. 337 In addition to court packing, PiS has introduced

328 See generallyRosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalismand EconomicInequality, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 372 (2018).
329 Marcin Piatkowski, Four ways Poland's state bank helped it avoid recession, BROOKINGS (June
12, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2015/06/12/four-ways-polands-statebank-helped-it-avoid-recession/.

330 ANNE APPLEBAUM, THE TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY 22 (2020).
ss WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN 14-16 (Oxford U. Press ed.,
2019)(arguing that the "anti-constitutional" element of Poland's backsliding is characterized by (i) the true
center of power in Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and (ii) actual constitutional violations, which can be distinguished
from (iii) statutory amendments to the constitution).
332 See Scheppele, supra note 319, at 552-53 (2018).
3 SADURSKI, supra note 333, at 15 (Nowogrodzka Street is the location of PiS headquarters and has

become synonymous with the place that all political decisions are made as Kaczynski is head of the PiS).
s4 Id. ("Power in Poland is held by an individual who is completely "invisible to the constitutional
design.")

Us Id. See also Fryderyk Zoll & Leah Wortham, Judicial Independence and Accountability:
Withstanding PoliticalStress in Poland, 42 FORDHAM INT'L L. J., 875, 878 (2019).
336 Joanna Fomina & Jacek Kucharczyk, The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in
Poland, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 58, 62-63 (2016).
337 See Bojan Bugaric & Tom Ginsburg, The Assault on Post-communist Courts, 27 J. DEMOCRACY
69, 72-75 (2016) (explaining that "Poland's Law and Justice Party have enacted legal and institutional
changes that simultaneously squeezed out electoral competition, undermined liberal rights of democratic
participation, and emasculated legal stability and predictability.").
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disciplinary measures for judges3 38 lowered the age of retirement, 339 restructured lower
courts, 34 0 and granted the president the power to extend a judge's term beyond
retirement as seen fit.34 1 These measures have triggered legal battles with the EU, such
as through Treaty of the European Union (TEU) Article 7(2) procedure to assess by
the Council whether there is a systemic violation of the rule of law. 34 2 Simultaneously,
through either infringement proceedings launched by the Commission against Poland
or through the judicial dialogue between the European Court and the Polish judiciary,
some crucial cases for the survival of judicial independence in Poland have reached
the Luxembourg court.
After the Juized Portuguez and Achmea rulings, the CJEU made clear that since
the Polish judiciary is subject to the rule of European intervention, it can no longer
ensure effective legal protections and judicial independence guaranteed under TEU
Article 19 and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ordinary courts are
empowered to apply EU law domestically. This principle was accepted by the Tribunal
in Decision of 19 December 2006, deciding whether a Polish law that forced passenger
cars not registered correctly in Poland to pay an excise duty ran afoul of Article 90.343
Although Polish courts argued that EU law did not apply, the Tribunal found that
Article 90 integrated EU law into Poland.34 4 Additionally, Article 91(2) gave EU law
higher status over national laws. 34 s Consequently, the Tribunal was the most
appropriate mechanism for resolving conflicts between international and State law. 34 6
The Tribunal concluded that Poland could impose an excise duty on non-harmonized
products, but only if the duty is "not higher than those imposed on similar domestic
products" under Articles 9 and 91(2) of the Polish Constitution and Article 10 of the
EC Treaty. 347
On April 3, 2018, Poland enacted the "New Law" which lowered the retirement
age for judges on the Polish Supreme Court from 70 to 65, required judges who were
appointed before the New Law was enacted to retire, and required presidential

33s Zamira Djabarova & Brittany Benowitz, A Back Door to ControllingJudges: Poland'sRuling
Party Tries Another Ploy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63381/a-back-

door-to-controlling-judges-polands-ruling-party-tries-another-ploy/ (Another PiS "reform" allows judges
to be investigated and sanctioned for their court rulings. These disciplinary actions appear to be politically
motivated targeting a number of judges, including those who had sent questions to the European Court of
Justice concerning the legality of the government's judicial overhaul).
339 See id. (Lowering the age of retirement from sixty-seven to sixty for female judges and sixty-five
for male judges. However, the justice minister, who is appointed by PiS, would have the power to extend a
judge's term).
34 Polandpushes controversialcourt reforms despite EU ruling, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 19, 2019)
[hereinafter Deutsche Welle], https://www.dw.com/en/poland-pushes-controversial-court-reforms-despiteeu-ruling/a-51312201.
341 Id.
342

See SADURSKI, supranote 333, at 192-241.

343

Case P-37/05-CT, Decision of 19 December 2006, 2006, in Selected Rulings of the Polsih
ConstitutionalTribunal Concerningthe Law of the European Union (2003-2014), 51 STUDIA I MATERIALY
TRUBUNALU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO, 80, 80-81 (2014), https://trybunal.gov.pl//uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_
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344 Id. at
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approval for extended terms. 34 8 After a reasoned opinion asking the Polish government
to change such legislation because it was incompatible with EU law, the Commission
launched an infringement proceeding against Poland under Article 258 TFEU,
triggering a number of important cases in Luxembourg attempting to block the Polish
democratic backsliding.
First, in June 2019 the CJEU held in Commission v. Poland that the New Law
was invalid and violated Article 19(1) TEU's requirement for judicial independence
and tenure. 34 9 The Court relied on its Ministerfor Justice and Equality precedent, in
which it enshrined the principle of judicial independence from the political branch
together with the principle of mutual trust among higher principles of EU law. 3 so In
particular, it called the principle of judicial independence as constituent to the
fundamental right of a fair trial in Article 47 of the Charter. 351 When Poland agreed to
the common values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and rule of law
referred to in Article 2 TEU in joining the EU, these include the right to judicial
protection. 3 s2 Consequently, Poland had to follow Article 19(1) TEU's requirements
of independence and tenure of judges that can only be determined by an express
legislation. 35 3 Because the New Law lowered the retirement age of judges, thus
dismissing their guarantees from removal from office and "prematurely ceasing" their
terms, it ran afoul of their independence and tenure now controlled by political fiat. 3s4
Additionally, because the President ultimately decided which judges would have
extended terms, Poland again violated independence and impartiality of the
judiciary.3 ss
The CJEU held that lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court Justices and
creating disciplinary measures to control the Polish judiciary was an attempt to pack
the courts with loyalists to the PiS. The Court held that this was in violation of the rule
of law and the principle of judicial independence protected under Article 19(1)
TEU.356 The CJEU also specified that whether the judges' mandate would end by an
obligatory retirement age or a fixed-term mandate was the choice made by the Polish
constitutional design that under compelling grounds could, by following the
appropriate measures and in a proportionate manner, remove a judge from office. 357
In a second Commission v. Polandcase decided on November 5, 2019, the Court
held that Poland had a duty to ensure the protection of judicial independence under
Article 19(1) of TEU. 358 The CJEU now found in applying its proportionality review
that the Polish legislation had no legitimate government interest because there was no
connection between lowering the age of retirement and the protection of EU law. 35 9
34s
34 9

Comm'nv. Poland, Case C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531.
Id.

3s See Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the System of Justice), Case C-216/18,
EU:C:2018:586, ¶ 58.
31
s Id. ¶48.
352 Comm'nv. Poland, EU:C:2019:531.
35 Id. _ 67.
354
Id.
35 Id.
356 Comm'nv. Poland, EU:C:2019:531.
3 Id. ¶ 76.
ass Comm'n v. Poland, Case C-192/18, EU:C:2019:924, ¶ 76.
35 9
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The CJEU specifically pointed to the principles of independent judiciaries as central
to the EU Treaty and that procedural rules governing the principle of tenure of judges
and its exceptions were not followed in the case of ordinary Polish courts. 3 6o
In a third Commission v. Polandjudgement on November 19, 2019, the CJEU
decided in three combined cases by stating that the rights of a fundamental remedy
enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights could not be
precluded by a non-independent court such as the newly-created Disciplinary
Chamber within the Polish Supreme Court. The CJEU created a three-factor test to
assess judicial independence: first, that the appointed members should be "capable of
giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law"; second, that the
court should not be influenced by "the direct or indirect influence of the legislature"
or the executive; and finally, that the court could assert its "neutrality with respect to
the interests before it." 361 By deferring the application of these three principles
interpreted together to the domestic courts, the CJEU reaffirmed the principle of
primacy of EU law to reassert the hierarchy of the European law on domestic law. 362
However, in the aftermath of this judgement a new bill called the "Muzzle Law"
was adopted by the Polish government to retaliate against the judges who followed
this ruling. 363 As some scholars have powerfully described, the Muzzle law has
established powerful proceedings able to break the rule of law in Poland, thus showing
how the CJEU rulings can be easily circumvented by the autocratic governments. 364
C.

Can the CJEUMake a Difference?

"Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg,"36 s the European Court of
Justice is enjoying great legitimacy in mobilizing a variety of EU interests through
litigation. However, not much political attention is paid to how the CJEU is becoming
a coalition builder among the different EU institutions that are seeking to work more
closely on limiting access to COVID-19 recovery funds to illiberal democracies in the
Union and in the implementation of EU values. In a Union where autocratic legalism
is well-entrenched, the CJEU is perceived as an additional safeguard to fight against
autocrats. Founded in 1952, the European Court of Justice began its work with seven
judges based in Luxembourg. Today the CJEU is composed of twenty-seven judges,
each nominated by one Member State and after consultation with an independent panel
of experts under TFEU 255, for a renewable term of six years. 366 As Mitch Lasser has
shown, through his meticulous recollection on the origins of the 255 Panel in the
360
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1990s, the urge to create this committee of experts reflected the fear of Western
European politicians to the accession of Central and Eastern European Member States
to the EU. 367 This accession could allow judges who had been trained in a socialist
regime with little training in capitalist and liberal constitutional values to sit on the
European bench.
This fear was not misplaced since the CJEU constitutes the highest supranational
constitutional Court in the Union tasked with the observance and uniform
interpretation of EU law. However, there are some civil law features that make the
CJEU especially hard to pack with partisan judges. For instance, the Court speaks in
unison and its precedents are binding, especially when deliberations happen in its
Grand chambers-constituted by fifteen judges-rather than smaller chambers of
three or five judges with less power to influence the jurisprudence of the court. 368
Dissenting and concurring opinions do not exist and to an extent these are replaced by
the opinions of the Advocates General, who serve as legal advisors to the Court. 369
Finally, the CJEU lacks the cult of personality that has pervaded the SCOTUS and
what some call the idol-like quality of some of its Justices. 370 With only a few
biographies of the EU judges and advocates general, with the exception of its current
President Koen Leanerts, these jurists sit for relatively short terms and rarely make the
news. Although long criticized for its formalist, opaque, technical, and indirect style
of jurisprudence, 371 the CJEU has today survived both the attacks by autocrats and the
over-politicization of judicial appointments that are undermining the legitimacy of the

SCOTUS. 372
If the legal diplomacy of the CJEU makes only a modest blow against the
Hungarian government of Victor Orbhn, which transformed his country into an
illiberal democracy or "mafia state," 373 this will be due to the powerlessness of the
Union vis-a-vis the autocrats. Back in 2018, the European Parliament voted_to move
forward on a preventive procedure enshrined in Art 7(1) TEU in case of "clear risk of
a serious breach of the Union's value" against Orbhn's government. If this political
tool received publicity worldwide, in the long term it has proven ineffective-Orbhn's
party Fidesz remains an active player within the main center-right political party of
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the European Parliament and the early retirement of the Hungarian judges was not
stopped by the CJEU rulings.374
On October 6, in Commission v. Hungary C-66/18,375 the Grand Chamber of the
CJEU held that the Hungarian law that singled out and forced the Central European
University (CEU), an academic institution located in the U.S., to relocate from
Budapest to Vienna violated EU law. This ruling comes at an important time to assess
the violation of EU values by autocrats and to limit their access to Union's funds. It
also follows the gradualist and formalist jurisprudence of the CJEU against the
Hungarian restrictions against civil society organizations376 and in seeking to protect
the Polish judiciary from political control. 37 7 Albeit as many have pointed out, both in
the case of the CEU that had to leave Budapest or the Polish judiciary that was
disciplined by Polish law, these rulings have had only symbolic rather than practical
effects.
Yet these cases are exemplary of the legal diplomacy of the CJEU that
consolidated the meaning of its separation of powers and federalism doctrines in its
foreign relations jurisprudence and now is deploying it vis-a-vis the measures taken
by the Polish, Hungarian and other governments in their attempts to weaken the liberal
rule of law in their respective countries.378 Recently, CJEU President Koen Lenaerts
wrote that the motto "in the court we trust" remains paradigmatic to the identity of the
European Union, whether about its market integration or individual rights protection
for which the national courts are the "gatekeepers" of the rule of law in the Union.379
Just like foreign arbitration tribunals, national judiciaries are an integral part of the
administration of justice in the supranational constitutional jurisdiction in which the
CJEU has the last say in interpreting EU law. In reaffirming the liberal rule of law and
the judicial independence of the Union's domestic courts, the President of the CJEU
is reclaiming its authority as trust in the self-preservation of the EU judiciary system.

CONCLUSION
In a "post-post-Cold War," 380 when authoritarian leaders seem to be the global
norm rather than the exception, 381 the strengthening of executive powers and
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constitutional backsliding in the Member States has led the CJEU to carefully reassert
its role by expanding the scope of its judicial review and balancing at the same time
foreign and internal conflicting considerations to establish a democratic and liberal
conception of the rule of law. According to the Court, the judiciary as a whole needs
to ensure the respect of the rule of law and the notion of judicial independence of
domestic or international tribunals when they interpret EU law. This consists of the
protection of fair trial procedures, judicial independence, and effective judicial
remedies, without which the equality under the law and the accountability of our
governments would be impaired.
The legal diplomacy of the CJEU offers new lenses to imagine courts, not only as
neutral umpires or targets for court-curbing measures, but also as strategic and reactive
institutions that can create more or less effective barriers to authoritarians through a
gradual, formalist and deferential judicial reasoning.382 The CJEU has entrenched a
liberal rule of law culture in the Union by working in synergy with other branches of
government, national judiciaries and civil society to hold firm the foundations of
liberal democracies through activism or deference, pragmatic and formalist legal
reasoning that is unescapably vulnerable of "suspicion of ideological corruption." 38 3
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